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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberal lawyers encounter grim alternatives caused by the Supreme
Court's relentless shift to the right, particularly if they consider stare
decisis a major constitutional value. They can attack specific decisions,
demonstrating inconsistencies with prior cases, conclusory reasoning and/
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A., Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Mimi Lord, Marjorie
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or poor policy. They can use history, jurisprudence or even literature to
make broad-based critiques of the Court's increasing callousness. They
can propose counter-doctrine which is consistent with existing caselaw.
The third response may appear quixotic, even naive, given the present
Court. Nevertheless, exploration of progressive alternatives illuminates
existing doctrine and provides potential openings if the Court ever decides
to become more compassionate.
This article pursues the third technique, maintaining that the Supreme
Court's most recent affirmative action decisions, City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson, Co. I and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.2 provides a surprising
opportunity for the Court to offer constitutional protection to many Amer-icans who are currently underprotected, particularly to poor children. In
Richmond, the Court held that a city violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment by mandating a fixed percentage of city
construction contracts for minority-owned businesses, even though the
Court had previously held in Fullilove v. Klutznik3 that Congress could
establish a virtually identical affirmative action plan to assist minorities
seeking state construction contracts that receive federal funding. In Part
II of the principal Richmond opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rhenquist and Justice White, distinguished Fullilove.4 O'Connor
decided that Congress had greater powers than the States to establish
affirmative action programs pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment: "That Congress may identify and redress the effects of so-
ciety-wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, that States and
their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are ap-
propriate." 5 Justice O'Connor neither justified this double standard, which
provided more judicial deference to Congressional action than to state
action, nor explored its implications. In Metro Broadcasting, all nineJustices accepted the argument that section five gives Congress more
powers then the states. But the bitter divisions among the Justices in
Metro over the merits6 indicates that the contours of this double standard
remains unresolved.
This Article will argue that the Richmond/Metro double standard is
acceptable in such difficult areas as affirmative action, particularly if the
Court also adopts this Article's primary proposal that the Court should
'109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
2 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
4 109 S.Ct. at 717-720. Justice O'Connor frequently cited Days, Fullilove, 96
YALE L.J. 453 (1987).109 S.Ct. at 719. Justice Scalia also distinguished between congressional and
state powers in his concurring opinion, id. at 735-39.6 Justice Brennan, writing for Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, concluded that section five gave Congress and the F.C.C. the power to create
minority preferences to enhance ethnic and program diversity. (Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S.St. 2997, 3010 (1990)). O'Connor, joined by JusticesScalia, Kennedy, and the Chief Justice, dissented on the ground that Congress
could only remedy identified past racial discrimination in the industry. Id. at3031. O'Connor's committment to Fullilove appears limited, at best.
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sometimes permit Congress to "dilute" Supreme Court decisions.
7 One
implication of the Richmond/Metro double standard is that the Court may
have also permitted Congress to "dilute" some of the Court's prior four-
teenth amendment decisions. The Court should have decided Fullilove,
Richmond, and Metro the same way even if the cases had arrived in a
different order; otherwise, basic constitutional rights and structures
would be resolved by timing, a factor no less arbitrary than a coin flip.
In other words, if the Court had first held that the Richmond plan violated
equal protection, it still should have upheld the Congressional minority
preferences. The apparent "right" of white contractors not to be prevented
on the ground of race from receiving governmental contracts in the ab-
sence of detailed findings of prior governmental racism would then have
been "diluted" or at least "limited" to the "right" not to be so treated by
states and local governments.
Now that dilution may be permissible, the Court should consider even
more dilution. Congress should be able to invoke its section 5 powers to
require or to permit states to establish affirmative action plans similar
to the one in Fullilove, thereby effectively overruling Richmond. Section
5 is not a general grant of authority to Congress; it specifically authorizes
Congress to enforce egalitarian values against the states. The section was
passed to help resolve this country's racial problems.
8 If Congress can
require the states to act in a certain way - mandating affirmative action
plans, for example - it should also be allowed to delegate its power to
the states to establish affirmative action plans, giving the states discre-
tion in applying the remedy. Such flexibility enhances federalism.
Dilution is consistent with the structural and policy arguments Justice
O'Connor made in Richmond. Justice O'Connor noted that the fourteenth
amendment is directly aimed at the states: "The Civil War Amendments
themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between congres-
sional and state power over matters of race."9 Any Congressional power
is less suspect, whether it affects federal activity (as in Fullilove), directly
regulates the states (as was also the case in the Fullilove), or is delegated
to the states. It is far harder for a vicious faction to take over Congress
than to dominate a state or local government. 10 Placing primary respon-
sibility for the affirmative action issue in Congress also resolves some of
the remedy's inherent dilemmas. Courts have difficulty determining
which groups should receive what forms of affirmative action, for how
long, and under what circumstances. For example, the Richmond plan
7 This endorsement of O'Connor's double standard does not extend to her ap-
plication of the standard. In the Richmond case, she should have deferred to the
Richmond legislature, particularly when Congress has established a similar rem-
edy and had not used its powers to prohibit the states from implementing similar
systems.
8 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1955).
9 109 S.Ct. at 719.
10 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). See also Quint, The Federalist
Papers and the Constitution and the United States, 77 Ky. L. J. 369 (1988-89);
Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of the Federalist Papers,
1985 B.Y.U.L. REv. 65 (1985).
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included "Orientals,"'1I but Asian-Americans are presently one of the most
economically successful groups in our society. Who should decide when
Asian-Americans no longer need special protection? As the Richmond
Court observed, the majority in many local communities consists of mi-
norities who might be tempted to use affirmative action plans not to
remedy prior wrongs, but for impermissible racial reasons.12 One also
might be less suspicious when the majoritarian Congress, dominated by
white males, decides to limit the powers of white males; such limits are
unlikely to be either too severe or stereotypical.13 Finally, prohibiting
Congress from reversing Richmond would generate doctrine approaching
incoherence. The Court would need to hold that section 5, which grants
Congress power to regulate the racial policies of states, only permits
Congress to condition its own grants, but does not allow Congress to make
the states comply with similar conditions.
The Court is not compelled to adopt any form of "dilution"; the issue
was not directly before the Court. Only three Justices joined Part II of
O'Connor's Richmond opinion, which used sections 5 to distinguish Ful-
lilove. The Court may conclude that individuals have radically different
rights depending upon whether the federal or state government is reg-
ulating them. The court may decide that the potential tension between
disparate state and federal rights is so severe that it must overrule Ful-
llove. Or the Court, now influenced by Justice Souter, may narrow Ful-
lilove. This article will not attempt to evaluate all the strengths and
weaknesses of the different potential interpretations of these three cases
and their myriad opinions. Instead, the article will focus on the desira-
bility and the constitutionality of a limited form of dilution, a conception
made viable, but not mandatory by RichmondMetro. Demonstrating the
value of this alternative is one of the best ways to argue that a limited
conception of dilution should be adopted.
The article's specific recommendation is as simple as it is controversial:
The Supreme Court should aggressively expand its definitions of equal
protection and due process, as applied to the states, by sometimes ex-
plicitly giving Congress the power to over-ride its decisions pursuant to
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The Court must specifically des-
ignate a right as dilutable; otherwise, neither Congress nor the states
can alter that right. The text of section 5 is sufficiently broad to support
such a construction: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.'14
11 109 S.Ct. at 713.
12 Id. at 722.
1 Id. O'Connor cited Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimi-
nation, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723, 739 n. 58 (1974). The Court should not be totallydeferential to congressional affirmative action plans. For example, it should pros-
cribe a congressional law authorizing affirmative action for white males becausethey have been previously discriminated against by earlier affirmative actionprograms. The Court should be particularly wary of an affirmative action program
that either disadvantages blacks, the historial beneficiaries of the FourteenthAmendment, or which benefits any racial-genetic group that dominates Congress.
'4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Professor Burt concludes: '"The language of §5 is simply fluid." Burt, Miranda and Title lI: A Morantic Marriage, 1969 Sup.
CT. Rxv. 81, 84 (1969).
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The new doctrine's impact would border on the paradoxical. By relin-
quishing some power over finality in certain designated areas, the Court
could expand rights in those areas. Because Congress would have the last
word, the Court could act where it had previously refused to intervene.
This final democratic check alleviates concerns about competency and
legitimacy, two classic justifications for judicial restraint. If the Court
either errs in its empirical assessments or seriously alienates the major-
ity, its actions could be corrected by a majority in Congress.
The following example demonstrates how the doctrine would operate.
In 1988, the Supreme Court held that states could charge bus fees to
indigent school children in Kadrmas v. Dickinson School District.15 Under
this Article's suggestion, the Court should initially hold that states could
not charge indigent children such fees under the equal protection clause,
but would also explicitly state that its decision could be reversed by
Congress via section 5. Consequently, the Court could and should recon-
sider Kadrmas, knowing that Congress would have the last word on the
always controversial issues of asset re-allocation.
How is the Court to determine which rights are dilutable and which
are not? Virtually all existing equal protection rights should not be di-
lutable; they were created under the assumption that the challenged
action was so "unreasonable" that neither the states nor Congress could
so act.16 Prior judicial formulations of equal protection rights constitute
the "core" of individual rights which are immune from the majoritarian
process; existing rights also provide the Court with a baseline and a
methodology for determining the scope of dilutable rights. The Court
would still retain the power to create new non-dilutable rights in the
future. On the other hand, the Court should be able to re-examine its
prior holdings refusing to grant equal protection, because those decisions
were premised, at least in part, on the assumption of judicial finality. A
large number of groups and individuals may seek assistance under the
suggested doctrine: the poor, the addicted, the disabled, the dying, AIDS
victims, the mentally ill, and the aged.
This Article shall explore this proposed doctrine of limited dilution by
applying it to poor children, a group that certainly needs more help from
society than it is currently receiving." Poor children are the most vic-
"108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988).
16 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 249 n. 31 (Brennan, J., dissenting and
concurring). Richmond and Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), may be partial
erosions of this rule. In Richmond, the court established a double standard; Plyer
implied that one might exist. In other words, the governmental action proscribed
in Richmond was not found to be totally irrational or invalid; Congress could do
what states could not. Thus for these two specific issues, dilution may already be
permissible despite a prior Supreme Court finding that the state action violated
equal protection.
11 There are three reasons to apply the new doctrine to poverty instead of
affirmative action. First, the court is not adequately assisting young poor children.
Second, one can better grasp the doctrine's strengths and limitations in a new
area. Affirmative action doctrine is extraordinarily complex. Third, the author
had completed an earlier draft of this article before Richmond was decided. The
main concern of this article was and is poverty among the young.
1990]
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timized group in our society. Unable to protect their interests by either
the vote or money, they see their numbers swell. A chasm lies between
their suffering and their existing constitutional rights.18 The Court hasfailed in its duty to protect innocent groups who have suffered from so-
cietal indifference and/or exploitation; political oppression of the innocentis a particularly odious form of tyranny. 19 It is now time to consider the
lives poor children are actually leading. After all, if no serious disease
exists, there is no need for a disruptive doctrinal cure.
II. POVERTY AMONG THE YOUNG: A BRIEF SURVEY
The Supreme Court periodically makes a decision that can best be
described in emotional terms, not analytical ones. My reaction to Ka-
drmas v. Dickinson School District,20 which validated a state's power to
charge a fee to indigent school children to ride a school bus, was one of
resigned disgust. The resignation was a response to precedent. Earlier in
the same term, the Court had decided in Lyng v. International Union,
UAW2 1 that Congress could deny food stamps to indigent families when-
ever a member of that family is on strike. In a relatively unknown case,
Carnes v. Kentucky,22 decided in 1977, the Court denied certiorari to re-
view a lower court decision allowing states to charge indigent school
children for their textbooks. There had been intervening reasons for hope
since Carnes; the Supreme Court had concluded that states could not bar
children of illegal aliens from attending public schools in Plyler v. Doe.23
But as we shall see, the Court has a history of limiting decisions favoring
the poor to the facts of such decisions.
18 Virtually every day new data emerges about the suffering of the poor: "Tak-
ing inflation into account, the average family income of the poorest fifth of thepopulation declined by 6.1 percent from 1979 to 1987, while the highest paidAmericans saw family income rise 11.1 percent." Richer Got Richer and PoorestPoorer From 1979 to 1987, New York Times, at 1, 3-23-89 col 3.9 This premise, which is a variation of Professor Shapiro's argument that theCourt should provide a special forum for the under-represented, will not be de-fended in this particular article. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THESUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-39 (1966). Not every article need be ajurisprudential exploration of postulates. Sometimes the best defense of a prop-
osition is to test its application.The premise does not easily fit into existing Supreme Court doctrine. Underthe new test, it would be far easier to prove systematic injury than it presentlyis to prove unconstitutional intentions. The Court would be required to articulategroup rights and individual rights for those who are not "discrete", "insular" oreven a "minority,"-for those who fail to meet any of the criteria under CaroleneProduct's footnote number four. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 304 U.S.144, 153 n.4 (1938). On the other hand, compassion for the innocent and wariness
of penalizing people for reasons beyond their control may partially explain theCourt's existing skepticism toward laws that penalize people with "immutable
traits".
-o 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).21 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988).
22 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (certiorari denied).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
[Vol. 38:3
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The source of the disgust is more personal. During the 1970s, I litigated
dozens of child abuse and neglect cases. The experience was so horrifying
that it rendered me academically mute, until now. I cannot forget hearing
about the temporary foster parents who inserted a lit cigarette up a five
year old girl's vagina "to burn the Devil out." Nor can I forget representing
the pathetic young man who applied a hot plate to his eight year old
daughter's leg, leaving behind a pattern of half-moon marks. I frequently
would return to my office from a morning in Juvenile Court to stare at
a wall, swamped by rage, sadness and even self-loathing. Withdrawal
into the academy has made life seem more benign. But the reality is that
many more children, particularly poor children, are presently being bru-
talized by their parents and by society than when I actively practiced
law.
No set of constitutional laws or doctrines can eliminate such tragedies,
but the law sends struggling families clear messages about their worth
(or worthlessness). These messages can either reinforce the cycles of pov-
erty and misery, or can be serious gestures of compassion and support.
Each generation of abused, neglected, and poor children will try to over-
come their past agony, particularly when they raise their own children.
If they believe they and their children are unwanted, irrelevant, even
despised, many of them will be less able to control the anger that inev-
itably accompanies childrearing. Their childrens' misery will be a grim
reminder of their present failures and their past suffering. At the same
time, each subsequent generation of poor children will also learn how
little they are cherished; their cruel teachers will be violence, hunger,
and ignorance. Many children and parents will transcend these advers-
ities. But many others will not. All may wonder, irrespective of the final
outcome, why they had to suffer so much in this affluent society. Perhaps
their parents are more responsible for their misery than is society, but
will the children be able to make that distinction? Can they forgive their
parents? Will they be able to forgive the rest of us?
This Article presented the two grisly anecdotes about child abuse to
remind the reader of the actual content of many deprived childrens' lives,
a content that easily can be obscured when only evaluating data, doctrine
and debate - the traditional fare of constitutional analysis. As we shall
see, the facts are not the focal point of the poverty dispute: the number
of poor children has increased dramatically during the 1980s at the same
time that the quality of their lives and the hopes for their future have
diminished. For example, AFDC benefits, adjusted for inflation, have
dropped thirty-three per cent between 1970 and 1984.24 Supreme Court
constitutional doctrine is not very ambiguous. The Court rarely will in-
tervene on behalf of poor children. The legal academic debate over the
constitutional rights of the poor is also discouraging. With a few recent
2' Staff Of House Comm. On Ways And Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Back-
ground Material And Data On Program Within The Jurisdiction Of The Comm.
On Ways And Means 378-79 (Comm. Print 1986). See also Old, but Far from
Feeble, 307 The Economist 7541, 30 (March 12, 1988).
1990]
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exceptions,25 liberal academics have offered process and structure to thepoor, while conservatives endorse, for numerous reasons, judicial re-
straint.
Are poor children suffering so much that equal protection doctrine
should be transformed?26 Before turning to the national statistics, which
are as distressing as any specific episodes of child abuse and neglect,
contemplate sociologist William Wilson's description of a public housing
project in Chicago:
Cabrini-Green includes eighty-one high- and low-rise build-
ings covering seventy acres on Chicago's Near North Side. In1983 nearly 13,000 people, almost all black, were officially
registered there; but ... many more reside there than appear
in the records ... Minors were 66 percent of the registered
population; 90 percent of the families with children wereheaded by women; 83 percent of the households were on welfare(AFDC or General Assistance), and 81 percent of the families
with children received AFDC in 1983. In a nine-week period
beginning in early January 1981, ten Cabrini-Green residents
were murdered; thirty-five were wounded by gunshots, includ-
ing random sniping; and more than fifty firearms were confis-
cated ....27
See Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALEL.J. 1700 (1986) [hereinafter Taylor]; Edelman, The Next Century of Our Con-
stitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HAST. L.J. 1 (1987) [hereinafterEdelman]; Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood,
86 COL. L. REV. 1103 (1986).This proposed doctrinal shift is neither totally dependent upon nor mandatedby this Article's major premise that the Court has an affirmative duty to protectthe suffering innocent. One could come up with less sweeping justifications forthe proposition, placing it more easily within the Court's existing jurisprudence.For example, the expansion of section five could be defended as a tool to helpinsufficiently protected "discrete and insular minorities."On the other hand, one could reject the proposed law because dilutable equalprotection would actually hurt or insufficiently help the disadvantaged. There is
always a gap between basic assumptions and applications of those assumptionsthrough doctrine, particularly when other competing interests must also beweighed in the balance, such as institutional competence and a presumption in
favor of majority rule.
26 Many conservatives might complain that this first question begs the impor-
tant question: why should need or suffering determine constitutional rights? Theywould argue that the Constitution was only designed to ameliorate certain forms
of suffering and injustice. Such retorts are really directed at this Article's as-
sumption that the Court has a duty to protect innocents from majoritarian oppres-
sion and indifference.
27 W.J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 25-26 (1987) [hereinafter W. WIL-SON]. Because of printing delays, the data in this article has become somewhatdated. For an update on the economic polarization in this society, see K. PHILLEPS,
THE PoLrTIcs OF RICH AND POOR (1990).As of December 1989, the Census Bureau reported that the poverty rate haddiminished somewhat to 12.8 percent of all Americans. That rate "was the lowestin the 1980's but was higher than for any year in the 1970's." Pear, U.S. ReportsPoverty Is Down but Inequality Is Up, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1990, A10, col. 1-5.Children continue to suffer the most: "The rate was 19.8 percent for childrenunder 18 years of age and 22.5 percent for those under 6. Half of black children
under 6 were living in poverty. Forty percent of Hispanic children and 17 percent
of white children under 6 were poor...." Id.
(Vol. 38:3
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss3/4
RECONSTRUCTING SECTION FIVE
Professor Wilson used the Cabrini-Green bloodbath, which was excep-
tional only in its intensity, to demonstrate his thesis that in the past
fifteen years a socially isolated underclass, consisting primarily of young
blacks, has emerged in the cities. These children no longer have the
positive examples of black middle class neighbors, who have moved to
safer, wealthier neighborhoods. 2 These ghetto children attend schools
that are unable to meet their educational needs; a 1984 survey of Chicago
non-selective segregated high schools revealed that "only 2,000 of the
original class of 25,000 students both completed high school and could
read at or above the level considered average for the rest of the country.
'
"
29
Little comfort can be gained from knowing the worst. The plight of an
average poor child is not that different from the misery in Cabrini-Green,
as can be seen from the aggregate statistics which track a typical poor
child's life from birth through adolescence. The most important fact is
that while the overall number of poor has increased significantly in the
1980s, the number of poor children has soared during this time. The
number of poor people has increased from 24.5 million in 1978 to 33.1
million in 1985, from 11.4 percent of the population to 14 percent.30 These
figures are based upon the official poverty line, which originally was
defined l at three times the amount needed for a frugal diet 32. As of 1984,
the poverty line for a family of four was $10,600, 33 an income level no
state welfare program met.3 4 Furthermore, the extent of severe poverty
has increased. Thirty percent of the poor had income at less than half of
the poverty line in 1975, 33 percent in 1980, and 37.9 percent in 1984.
35
Black children continue to suffer at far higher rates than any other ethnic
group.3 6
28 W. WILSON, supra note 27, at 7-8.
29 The Bottom Line: Chicago's Failing Schools and How to Save Them (Chicago,
Designs for Change, 1985) 2,5, quoted in W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED
58 (1987).
30 Edelman, supra note 25, at 11.
"1 The creators of the "poverty line" knew that the level they set was still too
low. Id. at 10.
32 D. MOYNmAN, FAMILYAND NATION 185 (1986) [hereinafter D. MOYNIHAN].
"Edelman, supra note 25, at 10.
1 Id. at 15.
3 Id. at 12.
36 Because black children continue to suffer in far higher proportions than
other children, one can make the argument that they deserve special protection
under the fourteenth amendment; if the goal of Brown was to provide equal
education and opportunity for black children, then that goal has not been fulfilled.
See Taylor, supra note 25. This Article will not pursue that line of argument for
several reasons. First, William Taylor has powerfully made that argument, id.
Second, the theory divides the poor along racial lines, when the problem needs
to be dealt with more uniformly, both as matters of principle (racially explicit
remedies should be kept to a minimum) and of politics (nonracial remedies are
less likely to be attacked). A broader remedial order can sometimes be less con-
troversial than a narrow, race specific opinion. The racial focus also misses the
problem of generational inequalities. Finally, most AFDC families are not black:
"in 1983, 43.5 percent of all AFDC families were black, 41.8 percent were white,
12.2 percent were Hispanic and American Indians, and the rest Asians." Chicago
Tribune, American Millstone 108 (1986) [hereinafter CHICAGO TRIBUNE, MILL-
STONE].
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While the number of elderly poor has decreased dramatically in the
past two decades, the number of poor children has increased from 13.8
percent in 1969 to 20.0 percent in 1984. 7 In his survey of the growing
destitution of the young, Senator Moynihan used several statistical com-
parisons to prove how much children were suffering: "In 1984 approxi-
mately 33.7 million people were poor. Children, who represented less than
27 percent of the overall population, comprised 40 percent of the poor.
Children were the only age group overrepresented in the poverty popu-
lation."3
The first hurdle poor children face is being born. The infant mortality
rate among poor families remains depressingly high; in the Chicago
ghetto of North Lawndale, the infant mortality rate "increased from 17.5
deaths per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 28.2 deaths per thousand in 1984."3 9
It is impossible to determine how many of those children who did survive
may have been permanently impaired by some combination of inadequate
maternal diet, emotional stress, alcoholism, and/or drug addiction.40
AIDS, which probably will spread the most quickly among the poor, is
another killer of infants.
Those poor children fortunate enough to be born healthy are likely to
be part of a continually deteriorating family structure. For example, the
percentage of black children raised in two parent families has dropped
from 63 percent in 1970 to 50 percent in 1978 to 46 percent in 1984.41
The correlation between single parent families and poverty is relentless;
75 percent of such families are poor.42 Children born out of wedlock tend
to be born into persistently poor families. The number of illegitimate
births in New York has increased from 11 percent in 1963 to 37 percent
in 1983.4 Although many families are only in poverty for a short period
17 Edelman, supra note 25, at 11-12. Senator Moynihan stated that in 1984 the
number of elderly who had incomes below the poverty line, after all noncashbenefits were included, fell to 2.6 percent while the percentage of poor children
only dropped to 14.9 percent. For children under six, the poverty rate was 17.5percent, seven times that of the elderly, D. MOYNiHAN, supra note 32, at 111-112.38 D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 112. Such statistics are somewhat confusingbecause writers vacillate between defining poverty in terms of cash income or in
terms of total benefits received. For example, in his book FAMILY AND NATION,Senator Moynihan fixed the poverty rate among preschool children at 24.0 percent
on page 95, and at 17.5% on page 112. Children tend to benefit less from theinclusion of noncash benefits since such a large amount of those benefits are
medical assistance, which primarily help the elderly. Judicial and political con-
servatives will note that such definitional problems-and the proof problems that
underlie them-provide another reason why courts should not become constitu-
tionally involved in wealth redistribution.
39 C- CAGO TRmUNE, MiLLsToNE, supra note 36, at 125 (1986).
40 The Chicago Tribune concluded that the medical efforts to save an infant
cost over $120,000. CICAGO TRMUNE, MILLSTONE, supra note 36, at 132. A single
murder can cost taxpayers over a million dollars, id. at 56. Yet a mother with
one child receives a total of $397.00 in Chicago, and pays $240.00 of that in rent,
Id. at 92, 257.
"W. WILSON, supra note 27, at 27.
42!d.
D. MOYNI-AN, supra note 32, at 172.
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of time, Professor Wilson estimates that 60 percent of the poor are caught
in a cycle which will last at least eight years."
Many children are not having their basic needs satisfied. Emergency
food distribution centers face ever-increasing demands that they cannot
meet. 4" The low-income housing stock continues to deteriorate; the esti-
mates on the number of homeless, some of whom are children, range from
250,000 to 3,000,000.46
Single parent families tend to be poorly educated, another disability that
is passed on to their children, who are more likely to drop out of high
school than their counterparts who live with both parents.
47
As these children grow older, their lives frequently deteriorate. Their
schools are at best inadequate, and at worst reinforce their negative self-
images.48 Many of their peers pressure them not to perform well.49 The
crime rate remains appallingly high; in 1980 "black children committed
51% of the violent juvenile crime in the United States... [and]... 15%
of all black adolescents in the 15-19 age group were arrested... ."50 The
drug problem only escalates. Crack, a highly addictive, yet inexpensive
form of cocaine, is being spread throughout the country by violent, highly
organized youth gangs.51 Many children have sex, and thus babies, at
younger and younger ages. Twelve and thirteen year old girls are fre-
quently becoming mothers. 52 Nor are these youngsters easily able to get
jobs in a society with a chronically high unemployment rate and with a
steadily decreasing offering in unskilled, decently paying jobs: "Only a
minority of non-institutionalized black youth are employed."53
Perhaps the most disturbing fact is that large numbers of these children
are becoming isolated from the rest of society- politically, intellectually,
physically, economically and legally. 54 They no longer have a complete
"W. WILSON, supra note 27, at 176.
- Edelman, supra note 25, at 9.
Id.
47 
W. WILSON, supra note 27, at 175.
48 Id. at 103.
49 The Principal of Lincoln High School in Jersey City described the problem:
Some guys could do Lincoln on one leg... But they don't connect education
with bettering their lives. For males, it's difficult to do well academically
and be respected by their peers. Some very talented boys are hesitant about
being talented. That's not the kind of thing the street honors. The street
likes cool, clever, shrewd. But the best algebra student? No. Crime's all
around. And they see the criminal element with the best cars, the flashiest
gold and the nicest clothes. They're always seeing someone with half their
intelligence with rolls of money.
The Principal traces part of the dilemma back to the home: "Imagine a home
where a child never sees an adult go to work on a regular basis." Jersey City
Schools: A Long Road to Second-Class Citizenship, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1988,
at 11, col. xx.
I D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 135.
11 Gangs Selling Crack Give Rise to New Wild West, N. Y. Times, June 21,
1988, at 11, col. xx.
52 D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 168.
53 W. WILSON, supra note 27, at 43.
- See, e.g., W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
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alliance with the black middle class, which has left the ghettos and hous-
ing projects, or with the black elderly, most of whom have escaped poverty
with the help of Social Security.5
III. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO AID POOR CHILDREN
Diluted equal protection should be provided to members of groups that
are innocent, suffering, and presently receiving inadequate judicial pro-
tection. The prior section demonstrated the wide-spread anguish of in-
nocent, poor children. This section shall examine the extent of
constitutional protection they currently receive from the Supreme Court.
The Constitutional history of the poor has been one of dashed hopes, the
greatest of which was that the court might someday find the poor to be
a protected "discrete and insular minority" under footnote four of Carolene
Products.5 Initially favorable rulings for the poor quickly become isolated
episodes, limited to their facts.
When the Court first considered the constitutional rights of the poor,
it sympathized with indigents.57 In Edwards v. California,8 Justice Jack-
son criticized the wealth discrimination contained in a state law making
it a crime to intentionally bring a poor person into the state: "We should
say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere property status,
without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights
as a citizen of the United States .... The mere state of being without
funds is a neutral fact - constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed,
or color."9 But even Jackson's statement has limits. If poverty is irrele-
vant to constitutional rights, then no constitutional right exists to be free
from poverty or its effects.
Chief Justice Warren wrote in a voting rights case that wealth and
race are "two factors which independently render a classification highly
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."60 In the
course of striking down a state poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, Justice Douglas stated: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or
poverty, like those of race ... are traditionally disfavored. ' 1 This serious
15 There are four times more black poor children than black poor elderly. D.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 97. In fact, the overall percentage of poor old people
has dropped from 35.2 percent in 1959 to 12.4 percent in 1984, evidence that
transfer payments can reduce or even eliminate poverty. Edelman, supra note
25, at 11.
56304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Jackson, J., concurring).
17 This discussion of indigents' rights relies heavily upon Lawrence Tribe's
recent treatise, which provides a full analysis, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW 1625-1672 (2nd ed. 1988) [hereinafter L.TmE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
314 U.S. 160 (1941).
59 Id. at 184-85.
o McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807(1969) (dictum).
61 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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scrutiny was not limited to statutes that discriminated against the poor
by charging a fee to engage in the constitutional right to vote (or to obtain
a divorce as in Boddie v. Connecticut 2). In a series of cases, the Court
ordered the state to pay certain costs of criminal litigation (including
attorneys' fees6), as well as to pay for welfare and to finance non-emer-
gency medical care 5 for indigents who had recently become state resi-
dents. Particularly heartening was Justice Brennan's dictum in Shapiro:
"On the basis of this sole difference [residency] the first class is granted
and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the
ability of families to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter, and
other necessities of life . . . ." As Justice Harlan pointed out in his dis-
sent, Brennan may have been laying the groundwork for a "fundamental
right" to "necessities of life.."
67
A. Suspect Class Analysis
Any hope that these cases would lead to significant protection for the
poor faded. With a few exceptions, such as finding unconstitutional a
state law requiring judicial approval of marriage of parents who have
court-ordered support responsibilities,- the Burger Court refused to ex-
pand the constitutional rights of the poor. A poor person did not have to
pay filing fees for a divorce,69 but had to pay a fifty dollar fee to obtain
a bankruptcy 70 and a twenty-five dollar fee to appeal an administrative
reduction in old-age assistance. An indigent criminal had a constitu-
tional right to resources for appeals of right, 72 but not for discretionary
appeals or for filing applications to the United States Supreme Court.
73
In all the other cases striking down a wealth-based regulation some other
constitutional interest was also at stake; the Court arguably was only
eliminating unconstitutional conditions to pre-existing rights or to dis-
cretionary benefits.7 4 Thus Edwards, Shapiro, and Maricopa County be-
came "right to travel" cases. Procedural Due Process concerns could
62 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
6 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
- Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
6394 U.S. at 627.
67 394 U.S. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Both Zablocki and Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), involve the fundamental right to marry, protected
by the due process clause.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
70 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
71 Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
72 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
73 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
14 See L. TRIBE, CONSTrrUTONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 781.
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independently explain providing assets to criminal defendants and pro-
hibiting states' conditioning the length of confinement on the ability to
pay a fine.5 The Court considers the right to vote the cornerstone of all
other constitutional rights; indeed, the Court in Harper struck down the
poll tax as applied to all citizens, not just to indigents.76
This counterattack did not just narrow precedents and ignore dicta.
The Court made it clear that the poor were not a "suspect class," and that
poverty usually was not a "suspect classification" in Ortwein v. Schwab,77
which clarified Dandridge v. Williams.78 The Dandridge Court had applied
the highly deferential rational basis test to uphold a statute setting a
limit to the amount of financial assistance a family could receive, thereby
preventing larger families from receiving any additional help even
though Congress and the state had computed that they needed more. The
Dandridge Court first noted that no constitutional right was affected. Nor
was there any identifiable suspect class; "the myriad of potential recip-
ients" who might claim relief presented such a mixture of groups within
the poor that the Court could see no way to determine which subgroups
deserved special judicial protection.7 9
The Court has not limited its deference to laws that injure the poor
financially. States could pass statutes that facially isolate and politically
weaken the poor. The Court decided in James v. Valtierras° that a state
could amend its constitution to prevent the construction of low-rent hous-
ing projects unless those projects were approved by a majority of voters
in the relevant state public body, even though the Court previously held
that states could not establish similar procedures that hindered the cre-
ation of anti-discrimination housing laws in Hunter v. Erickson.8 1 Race,
but not wealth, triggers heightened scrutiny. The inspiring rhetoric of
Edwards had disappeared; states could make poverty a relevant disabling
characteristic.
82
Having refused to evaluate statutes that either deprived the poor of
needed funds or that overtly put the poor in a politically weak posture,
the Court predictably extended its deference to laws having a particularly
severe adverse impact on the poor. In Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group" the plaintiffs argued that a congressional
law, which denied financial aid to any students who did not register for
76 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395(1971).
76 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
11 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973).
78 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
7 See id. at 487.
8 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
"1 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
82 States also could enforce laws that arguably perpetuate such stigmatic ster-
eotypes about the poor as their alleged unwillingness to seek employment. SeeNew York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 431-32 (1973)(Marshall, J., dissenting) (decided on preemption grounds).
468 U.S. 841 (1984).
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the draft, discriminated against the poor. Although Chief Justice Burger,
like Anatole France, was certainly correct in observing that the law treats
both rich and poor equally, "denying aid to both the poor and the
wealthy," 4 he ignored the fact that only the poor and relatively poor
would be affected by the law. He never responded to Justice Marshall's
dissenting observation that the rich are rarely eligible for financial aid.8 5
That same year the Court rejected a First Amendment attack against a
law banning the posting of election signs on public property, even though
putting signs on telephone poles might be the only feasible campaign tool
for the poor.86 The Kadrmas Court reaffirmed such reasoning in the course
of upholding a school bus fee that burdened poor families and children:
"We have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different
effects on wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected
to strict equal protection scrutiny. "87
The Court has rejected the argument that discrimination against the
poor may be a pretext for racism against blacks since so many blacks are
poor. In Jefferson v. Hackney,8 Justice Rehnquist held that black welfare
mothers (and their children) cannot successfully challenge a state law
that distributed more welfare benefits per capita to disabled and aged
people than it did to AFDC recipients, even though AFDC had a higher
percentage of blacks.8 9 The State could choose to allocate scarce resources
among competing groups as it saw fit, even though those allocations
might, in the aggregate, favor whites more than blacks. Justice Rehnquist
separated race from wealth, even though most policies that discriminate
against the poor will disproportionately injure blacks since a higher per-
centage of blacks are poor.
The Court's refusal to consider the poor to be a "discrete and insular
minority" under footnote four of Carolene Products generates two criti-
cisms. Either the test itself is insufficient, or the Court failed to use
properly the Carolene Products test.9° For example, Professor Ackerman
has pointed out that members of groups like the poor and homosexuals
do not really fit under the adjectives "discrete" or "insular," yet they need
equal protection assistance.9 ' One cannot immediately identify the poor
1Id. at 859 n. 17.
Id. at 862 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
87 108 S.Ct. at 2487.
406 U.S. 535 (1972).
406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972).
90 Given the judicial tolerance of facial discriminations, overt deprivations and
foreseeable side effects of laws that injure the poor, one should not be surprised
that the Court never had to reach the more vexing problems of state toleration
of poverty. The Court never considered how the common law, existing public law,
the allocation of resources via governmental budgets, the market and the private
sphere all combine to oppress the poor.
91 Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1985); see also
Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and the Fate of the 'Insider-Outsider', 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 1291 (1986).
1990]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
or the gay by looking at them. However, failure to meet the Carolene
Products test should not end the inquiry; the Court has not relied exclu-
sively upon the test. Professor Ely noted that women receive heightened
scrutiny even though they are not discrete, insular, or a minority.9 2 Thus
the Court should follow its own lead in the sex discrimination cases to
expand equal protection beyond the Carolene Product's test. In the al-
ternative, the Court could have held that the poor are the archetype
"discrete and insular minority": victims of centuries of class conflict,
oppression, and isolation.
B. Fundamental Rights Analysis
The Court's unwillingness to find poverty a suspect classification or the
poor to be a suspect class in Ortwein v. Schwab did not end the consti-
tutional struggle. The Court has an additional doctrinal tool which it
could have used to aid the poor. It could have relied upon Shapiro to hold
that certain necessities were "fundamental rights" protected by substan-
tive equal protection, thereby placing a duty on the state to provide
enough relief to satisfy those needs. The Supreme Court, however, has
decided that poor people do not have fundamental rights to food,93 shel-
ter,94 education, 9' welfare,96 or medical care.9 7 Additionally, a prior judicial
finding of a fundamental right, such as the right to have an abortion,
does not trigger a state obligation to support that right with public fi-
nances.98
Justice Brennan's apparent effort to provide "basic necessities" to the
poor in Shapiro v. Thompson thus seemed to be a false start until he
obtained four additional votes in Plyler v. Doe"9 to overturn a state law
preventing the children of illegal aliens from attending public schools.
Justice Brennan conceded that education is not a "fundamental right,"
but replied that education performs a "fundamental role in maintaining
the fabric of our society."'00 Without putting the children of illegal aliens
into a suspect classification, Brennan criticized the law for improperly
burdening this group of children: "[T]he children who are plaintiffs in
these cases 'can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status
.... Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults
"2 The Court was appropriately more concerned about actual prior treatment
of women and the dehumanizing effect of being injured because of one's sex than
it was about footnote four.
See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S.Ct. 1184 (1988).
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
9 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
* Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
9
, d.
1 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For a critical reaction, see Hutchinson, More Substantive
Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup. CT. Rlv. 167.
110 457 U.S. at 221.
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by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a par-
ent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice . . ."0o Brennan intensified judicial scrutiny by
combining the theme of individual innocence with the suspect state action
of totally depriving those innocent people of something both they and
society vitally need.
Brennan distinguished San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, which
had held that children in poor school districts had no constitutional right
to equal funding with children in wealthy districts because education is
not a fundamental right, on the ground that the Rodriguez plaintiffs were
not being totally deprived of an education, but the Plyler plaintiffs were
prohibited from receiving any public education. Justice Powell, who con-
curred in Plyler, had stated in his Rodriquez opinion that the unequal
tax system did not completely deprive anyone of an education, nor had
the system failed "to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process."'
0 2 Thus, Powell was
willing to side with Brennan when the state law prevented the children
from receiving any public education in Plyer.
The "total deprivation" and "basic minimal skills" concepts have hope-
ful connotations in terms of more basic needs such as food and shelter,
but the current Supreme Court will not extend its heightened scrutiny
beyond education. Even Marshall and Brennan (albeit in an effort to
distinguish precedent with which they did not initially agree) 03 stated
in Rodriguez: "the close nexus between education and our established
constitutional values with respect to freedom of speech and participation
in the political process makes this a different case from our prior decisions
concerning discrimination affecting public welfare and housing ....
Their distinction makes little sense. A person is very unlikely to get a
decent education or to participate in the political process if he or she is
very hungry and/or in physical discomfort due to lack of clothing, housing
or medical care. Furthermore, as shall be discussed below, the Court will
be far less willing to examine financial discrimination in education after
Kadrmas v. Dickinson School District. The complete deprivation concept
is also too weak. Does the state satisfy Plyler if it offers special courses
to children of illegal aliens once a week?105
The fundamental rights analysis is preferable to the "suspicion" themes
because it focuses more directly on both the universality and the nature
1o1 Id. at 220.
102 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (emphasis added).
101 Id. at 98. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 115 n.74.
105The Court can avoid this problem by requiring the state to provide the same
education as it provides everyone else. Of course that maneuver does not resolve
what constitutes the "same education." The state is arguably providing the "same
education" to everyone when it charges everyone the same fees. See Kadrmas v.
Dickinson School District, 108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988).
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of poor people's "rights" and needs, and thus on potential remedies. Forinstance, the Court could protect a "fundamental need" for food, clothing,
education, shelter and medical care by establishing a minimum some-
where above complete deprivation.106 If the Court requires that the state
avoid complete deprivations and meet minimal needs, it does not haveto reject the market place or the state's use of pricing mechanisms in
other contexts (such as charging tuition to attend state universities). Thefundamental needs analysis also tends to avoid blaming the states and/
or the market. The Court does not have to decide if the poor have been
viciously treated; they deserve basic needs because of their humanity andtheir dignity. But in all other respects, re-expanding fundamental rights
raises the same underlying problems that led the Court to refuse to findthe poor to be a "suspect class" or poverty to be a "suspect classification."
The Court must still worry about political reactions, remedial difficulties
and accusations of illegitimacy.
The Supreme Court may have eliminated those anxieties in Kadrmas
v. Dickinson School District,o107 which exploited upon Plyler's limitations.The majority, which contained Powell's replacement, Justice Kennedy,
relied upon Burger's Plyer dissent and Powell's Plyler concurrence to
characterize Plyler as "unique."108 The Court noted that the Kadrmasplaintiffs' children were not being prevented from going to school; the
children were not being penalized for their parents' illegal behavior; andthe state's policy was unlikely to create a "sub-class of illiterates."109Indigent school-children, who were not members of any "suspect class",had no fundamental right to education,11o and had no constitutional claim
on the ground that the policy would hurt them more than less impov-
erished children."' Not only was Plyler limited to its facts, but also itsreasoning was equally reduced. Admittedly, even after Kadrmas, the state
cannot bar students from an existing classroom; that much of Plyler re-
mains. But the state can charge large fees that will effectively prevent
many students from attending school and will create a sub-class of illit-
erate, uneducated people. Underlying the Court's reasoning is a cheerful
view of market mechanisms; nobody is "prevented" from doing or having
something because they cannot afford it. Apparently the state is not atfault for charging families fees to send their children to school; the fam-ilies are at fault for not having the money.
106 The "complete deprivation" is a particularly easy tool for the judiciary to
administer. The Court simply determines if the state is barring the plaintiff fromany relief. The test, however, is insufficient, failing to address "significant dep-rivation"-when the state provides some resources to meet fundamental needs,but does not provide sufficient resources.
107 108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988).
108 108 S.Ct. at 2488.
109d.11O Id. at 2487.
- Id.
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The Court distinguished prior cases requiring the states to sometimes
provide judicial resources to indigents on the theory that the state had
a monopoly over the judiciary. 112 Even if one assumes that distinction is
constitutionally relevant, it seemed applicable in this case; all children
are legally required to attend school. Thus the Court has placed poor
families in a dilemma. They must either try to pay bus fees they cannot
afford or they must break a law they desperately want to comply with.
The Court also tried to minimize the case's impact because the fee rep-
resented a low percentage of the service and was waivable. Yet there is
nothing in the opinion that prevents the state from charging the families
for the full cost of the service, a charge that would exceed a thousand
dollars. Nor was there any indication in the record that the fee will be
waived by the State."
13
The implications of the Court's reasoning were even more disturbing
than it's final decision: "The Constitution does not require that such
service be required at all, and it is difficult to imagine why choosing to
offer the service should entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for
free."' 1 4 States can now probably charge a general fee for education if
they so choose, since they are under no federal constitutional obligation
to provide education, which is not a "fundamental right." One might try
to argue that the Court's reasoning only applied to "optional services"
such as providing school buses; the Court held that the State's "rational
purpose" was charging for "optional services" for the purpose of expanding
their coverage.1 5 However, according to the Court, education itself is an
"optional service" since it is not constitutionally required, not a funda-
mental right and not deserving rigorous scrutiny. The State may not be
able to deprive overtly a poor child of his or her education, but it now
may make that education inaccessible for the child of a poor family.
The last remaining avenue for poor people was also closed in the 1988
Term. In 1973, the Court held in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
that Congress could not limit food stamps in a household to those related
to each other. 1 6 The Court seemed to give special weight to the basic
need for food, and to the fact that Congress apparently was punishing
certain unpopular groups, "hippie" families. The case was unusual be-
cause the Court utilized the rational basis test, which normally is highly
deferential, to strike down a Congressional plan. The Court radically
limited Moreno in Lyng v. Castillo, which held that Congress could limit
the family unit eligible for foodstamps to parents, siblings, and children
who live together, and could exclude more distant relatives.
1 7 The Court
"'Id. at 4780.
113 Kadrmas also highlights the different judicial treatment accorded to some
black children. Black children have a right to free school bus trips to help de-
segregate schools, but poor children, many of whom are black, have no right to
get a free bus trip to attend any school.
114 108 S.Ct. at 2489.
115 Id.
116Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
117 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
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completed the process when it held that Congress could bar foodstamps
to families any time a member of that family is on strike in Lyng v.
International Union, UAW.""8 Hunger is a constitutionally valid political
weapon.
C. Poor Children as a Suspect Class
Given its unwillingness to help the poor, it is not surprising to learn
that the Court has found that discrimination against the young does not
warrant intensified judicial scrutiny. The young are easily distinguish-
able from the rest of us; they are "discrete." Children are more innocent
and more vulnerable than the rest of us. They have little direct political
power since they cannot vote, but the Court has never held that they are
a "discrete and insular minority" suffering from a history of oppression.
After all, all the oppressors and the oppressed, the majorities and the
minorities, were once children. Furthermore, the Court has constitution-
alized the lesser status of children. Children can be spanked in schools
without a prior hearing;119 they can be placed in mental institutions
without any hearing;120 and they have no First Amendment rights when
they write for a school newspaper.' 2' Such judicial paternalism has not
always generated unsympathetic results. The Court has sometimes been
more skeptical of legislation that injures the young for reasons beyond
their control. In Mathews v. Lucas,'22 for example, the Court decided to
increase its scrutiny of statutes that disadvantaged illegitimate children
because illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control, bearing "no re-
lation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to so-
ciety."123 Similarly, the Plyler Court voided a statute that prohibited the
children of illegal aliens from attending public schools.
One might respond that poor children, who suffer both from the physical
deprivation of poverty and the political impotence of youth, constitute a
unique "discrete and insular minority." The two disabilities have a cu-
mulative impact that requires the Court to intervene, even though the
Court will not protect individuals suffering from problems caused by
having only one of those characteristics. This argument is not merely
rhetorical. Over the past twenty years, poor children have been receiving
a smaller share of the gross national product. And as noted earlier in this
Article, poor children are becoming more socially isolated from the rest
of us. This argument also partially escapes existing unfriendly precedent.
The goal is not to constitutionalize the rights of all the poor, some of
Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988).
"'Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
120 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).121 Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988).
122 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
2 Id. at 505. Of course, poverty is also beyond a child's control.
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whom may be partially or even primarily responsible for their fate, but
to protect that subclass of the poor which is wholly unresponsible for its
misery-poor children.
A majority of the Court would probably reply that poor children do not
suffer from permanent discrimination caused by immutable and inescap-
able traits such as sex or race, traits that have been previously used both
to stigmatize and to dominate. Although many poor youth will not be
able to hide the fact of either their youth or their poverty, they do not
carry both of those badges with them for the rest of their lives. Many
poor children leave both their youth and their poverty behind. Nor are
they completely "insular." They benefit from the efforts of wealthy and
middle class parents to raise their own children, since those groups 
do
not want to see children, as a class, be totally crushed. Of course, such
hopes have diminished after the Court, in Milliken v. Bradley1
2 4 and Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,'
12 allowed the more
wealthy to segregate themselves from the poor and to educate their chil-
dren in either suburban or private schools. For precedential support, a
hostile Supreme Court majority would return to Jefferson v. Hackney,
26
which upheld a state welfare program that paid out substantially more
to the aged and disabled than to poor mothers and children even though
the latter group had far more blacks in it; to Dandridge 
v. Williams,127
which did not require the state to provide additional help for additional
children, and to Kadrmas v. Dickinson School District,
128 which upheld
charging school bus fees to indigent school children.
IV. THE VALUE STRUGGLE UNDERLYING THE COURT'S
RELUCTANCE TO HELP THE POOR
Even a cursory examination of present equal protection doctrine reveals
its political content. The "suspect class" and "suspect classification" 
meth-
odologies search for improper state motives. A group or class of people
become suspect because they have been persecuted by the majority. A
classification becomes suspect because it has been used by the majority
to oppress people, usually by deindividualizing them.
129 The Court must
124 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
125 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
126 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
127 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
128 108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988).
129 For example, the Court will consider an American Indian's claim that he
or she was discriminated against for being a member of a relatively powerless
ethnic group, a "suspect class." Yet the Court will also review a white 
male's
challenge to laws that discriminate on the basis of sex even though the 
plaintiff
is not a member of a powerless minority; sex is a "suspect classification" because
prior legislative majorities have frequently used it to perpetuate inappropriate
stereotypes. If the plaintiffs fail to fit under either of these tests, the 
Court will
apply the "rational purpose" test, which usually consists of rubber stamping 
the
government's action.
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turn to history to determine which groups have been disadvantaged and
to ascertain which classifications have often been used inappropriately
to injure innocent people. This search for a bad actor or a bad belief,
tainted by history, has undercut the poor's position before the Court.
Historical interpretations of poverty reflect such underlying political ideo-
logies as conservatism, modern liberalism, democratic socialism, or Marx-
ism. For instance, if one believes that class conflict has been a more
consistent, widespread, and intractable phenomenon than either racial
oppression or sexual conflict, one might well conclude that poor people
are the group, the class, that American society has treated most harshly.
Poverty should be one of the most "suspect classes."
The existing Court has been unwilling to find such evil motives in our
society. It refuses to conclude that poverty is caused in part by intentional
choice or by governmental ill-will, even though poverty could be com-
pletely eliminated in this country by transferring one ninth of the defense
budget to welfare programs.3 0 There are several reasons why the Court
has not protected the poor as much as blacks or women, even though a
huge overlap exists between the groups. Wealth distinctions, unlike racial
or sexual distinctions, have served and continue to serve many purposes
that most Americans consider legitimate. Wealth has historically been
the most significant criteria in determining power and status. Unequal
distributions of wealth are the inevitable and even desirable outcomes of
a market system, which is designed to provide the twin benefits of in-
creasing overall income and of distracting people from more contentious
issues.131 One can conclude that the poor deserve far less constitutional
The distinction between "suspect classes" and "suspect classifications" is fre-quently unclear. A black plaintiff may challenge a statute making racial dis-tinctions both because it injures blacks, a historically disadvantaged group, andbecause it uses an inherently suspicious and generally irrelevant criteria, race.The emphasis in "suspect class" analysis is on protecting unfairly treated groups,
while the primary objective of "suspect classification" scrutiny is to protect in-dividuals from being discriminated against for either improper or irrelevant rea-
sons. In other words, "suspect class" analysis tends to lead to group rights, while
"suspect classification" analysis is premised on individual rights. This distinction
is particularly ambiguous when applied to the poor, if only because the judicial
result will be similar under either approach. Whether one considers poverty tobe a manifestation of group politics or a derogation of an individual's rights via
vicious stereotypes, usually the only meaningful judicial remedy is money.
130 Harpers Magazine, Harper's Index 15 (6-88, Vol. 276, #1657). The Senate
recently passed a $157 billion bail-out of the savings and loans industry, SavingsBill is Cleared By Senate, N.Y. Times (4-20-89), page 25, col. 6. That gigantic
amount, which will need to be increased over the years, is one third of the esti-
mated $46.6 billion per year currently needed to bring all of America's poor up
to the poverty line in terms of cash benefits, Edelman, supra note 25, at 50 n.189. In short, our society is willing and able to make huge transfer payments
when it perceives a serious problem.
For a historical review of welfare in America, see M. KATZ, IN THE SHADOWOF THE POOR HOUSE (1986). Katz concluded: "In a nation as smart, inventive,
and rich as America, the continuation of poverty is a choice, not a necessity." Id.
at 291.
131 See Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 49 (1982).
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protection than women or blacks, who were legally prevented from ef-
fectively participating in the market for reasons totally beyond their
control: the immutable traits of sex and skin color. Arguably the poor, as
a group, have faced no arbitrary barriers; they have had the same op-
portunity to succeed in the marketplace as the rich, but they have been
injured primarily through their own actions or inactions. Indeed, many
people escape poverty every generation, while others who were once eco-
nomically comfortable become destitute. In short, according to this ar-
gument, the poor have not been discriminated against for reasons
unrelated to their behavior; they are not innocent victims of malicious
stereotypes or systematic exploitation, but are suffering for their own
faults. The reason they are poor is that they have little to offer others
through the market.
Such thinking coincides with conservative antipathy to welfare. Con-
servatives are generally reluctant to support welfare transfer payments
because such transfers disturb the presumptively valid legal universe
created by the common law; because such funds go from the "deserving"
to the "undeserving"; because welfare payments are counter-productive
by reallocating resources from capital to consumption, thereby diminish-
ing overall wealth at the ultimate expense of the poor; because such
payments demoralize the poor; and/or because such transfers undermine
the power of the wealthier classes. Such fundamental political hostility
to wealth transfers is reinforced by theories of judicial restraint, based
upon concerns about judicial competence and/or separation of powers.
Even if a majority of the Justices suddenly became politically predis-
posed to helping poor children, and were willing to work around existing
precedent, that majority would face a variety of institutional limitations.
Although the judicial regulation of poverty is not a nonjusticiable political
question, judicial intervention would trigger many of the same anxieties
that underlie the political question doctrine.
132 Discrimination against
the poor, by definition, revolves around lack of money. Consequently, in
virtually every case the Court would have to reallocate resources to al-
leviate the problem. The Court is wary of reallocating resources because
that remedy smacks of legislation, threatening separation of powers prin-
ciples. After all, the Constitution textually requires that all bills for
appropriations and for taxation originate in the House of Representa-
13 The Court has set out a multi-prong test to determine if an issue is non-
justiciable:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pron-
ouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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tives. 3 3 As James Madison explained in The Federalist Papers, "the leg-
islative department alone has access to the pockets of the people. '134 The
Court's primary role is to set limits on governmental action, not to re-
distribute resources. The Supreme Court cannot as easily and as inex-
pensively remove a clause from a statute or state action that injures the
poor as it can when reviewing laws drawn on racial or sexual lines. For
example, most racist statutes can be cured simply by eliminating the
offensive language, 13 5 but the primary remedy for most forms of wealth
discrimination is a transfer of money or services.
The Court is becoming increasingly wary of finding constitutional
rights not clearly based in the text and history of the Constitution. Moving
beyond text and history tends to substitute the views of nine judges for
the presumptively valid will of the majority: "The Court is most vulner-
able and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution.136 Although "equal" is a notoriously ambig-
uous adjective that could handle wealth transfers, and "equal protection"
implies relief beyond "equal rights," nobody is arguing that the Framers
of the fourteenth amendment thought that their Amendment would re-
quire massive wealth transfers. The text may be willing, but the history
is weak.
The Court may also be wary of the political backlash of aiding poor
people, just as it apparently was when it refused to extend busing and
public housing into the suburbs. 3 7 A twenty billion dollar injunction 38
transferring wealth from one segment of the population to another would
almost certainly provoke public outrage and charges of "taxation without
representation" that could cripple the Court in fulfilling its other duties.
The Court has often been wary to act when the consequences of judicial
action are controversial, momentous and unpredictable.1 9
133 U.S. CONST. art.I, § 7.
134 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, 310 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961).
-
3 The invalidation of some discriminatory statutes did have financial over-
tones. Professor Simon observed that several of the Supreme Court cases finding
sex discrimination in Social Security cases not only redistributed money from
one sex to the other, but also from one group to another within each sex. Simon,Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1477-86 (1986).
118 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
137 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
138 Gary Burtless referred to a study indicating that it would cost $11.9 billion(1984 dollars) to implement a program that would eliminate poverty for husband-
wife families and single-parent families with children. The plan would meet thepoverty line, taxing earnings at a seventy percent rate and unearned income at
a 100 percent rate. Burtless, Public Spending for the Poor: Trends, Prospects, andEconomic Limits 43, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND wHAT DOESN-r, (S.
Danzinger and D. Weinberg, eds., 1986) [hereinafter FIGHTING POVERTY].
139 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). The Court's initial avoidance
of the slavery issue, followed by its ultimately disastrous resolution in Dred Scott,provide classic examples of the perils of judicial involvement in fundamentalpolitical disputes, see The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); Dred Scott v.Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See, e.g., R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED
(1975).
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Furthermore, the state's actions which most disadvantage the poor have
been to tolerate and to encourage the workings of the market. The gov-
ernments' constitutional sins frequently have been of omission, not com-
mission. Most state actions do not overtly discriminate against the poor
by expressly injuring them; the state just prices the poor out of the market,
either directly (through charging fees), in conjunction with the market
(by requiring five acre home lots, for example), or by not helping them
affirmatively. Thus the scope of the inquiry becomes simultaneously very
broad and very indeterminate. Is the market mechanism unconstitu-
tional? Is the state's use of the market mechanism always unconstitu-
tional? For instance, can the state never charge fees for services because
all fees fall more heavily upon the poor? Has the government acted un-
equally when it has distributed most of its transfer payments and tax
breaks to the corporations and to the middle class instead of the poor?
Implementation problems reinforce these arguments in favor ofjudicial
restraint. It is hard to design an ongoing remedy which is so contingent
upon shifting empirical data. Assuming that the state is not totally de-
priving a group of people of any fundamental need, how much more must
a state provide? Must the Court fulfill the Rawlsian requirement of "just
needs?"1 40 Must it only eliminate absolute poverty (whatever that means)
or must it also alleviate relative poverty? In other words, can the Court
only prevent starvation, or must it eliminate malnutrition or even a poor
diet? How is a Court to determine the level of payments when there is a
recession or when there is inflation? Must the remedy reflect the different
costs of living in different parts of the country? How can a Court determine
the appropriate mix of cash and non-cash benefits?
The Court will also have to overcome two policy arguments against
increasing welfare payments to poor children. Charles Murray has argued
that welfare increases and perpetuates poverty; welfare should be elim-
inated, not increased. 1 4 Even if one does not accept that analysis, one
has to recognize that increasing welfare benefits creates disincentives to
work at low-paying jobs. Millions of Americans who work do not earn
enough to escape poverty. Raising the level for the non-working poor
requires the formulation of a sliding scale for the working poor to create
incentives to keep working. Courts are poorly designed to respond to such
perpetually changing factors.
V. THE LEGAL ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO POVERTY
The Court's debate over what aid, if any, to give to the poor has echoed
into the legal academy. Perhaps surprisingly, if one were to take nine
leading constitutional scholars who represent the traditional liberal-con-
140 j.RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
141 C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND
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servative spectrum, one would discover little more hope for the poor than
one finds on the existing Supreme Court. Conservative academics gen-
erally oppose judicial wealth transfers for a combination of political and
institutional reasons, while most liberal law professors limit intervention
to improvements in process or structure. The reinforcing themes of ju-
dicial incompetence and deference to the elected branches have prevailed
over the cries of the poor.
Inspired by John Rawls' A Theory of Justice,142 Professor Michelman
proposed that the Court engage in significant wealth re-allocation under
the fourteenth amendment. 143 Rawls had argued that if everyone had to
formulate a society behind a "veil of ignorance" which prevented them
from knowing their future individual fate, they would agree to live by
the "Difference Principle," which tolerates only those economic inequal-
ities that ultimately benefit the worse-off groups in society. Everyone
would thus have best insured himself against such disasters as being born
poor or becoming disabled. Michelman proposed that Rawls' scheme of
distributive justice become part of equal protection doctrine. An affluent
society like America should at least satisfy the basic needs of all persons.
Before becoming federal appellate judges, Judge Winter and ex-Judge
Bork led the conservative counterattack. Judge Winter presented a series
of complaints against using the equal protection clause to redistribute
wealth. Transferring wealth to poor people distorts the market, which
would be counterproductive in the long run for the poor because their
best hope lies in greater overall prosperity.1' Egalitarian ideals become
distorted by political pressures; the welfare impulse will end up benefit-
ting intermediaries and politically powerful special interest groups. 145
Winter did not limit his criticisms to policy objections. Using equal
protection to aid the poor would be improper lawmaking, reviving the
subjective techniques used by the Lochner court in the discredited era of
economic substantive due process. Such doctrine also conflicts with the
text and the Framers' intentions: "[Ilt not only finds no support in the
language or discernable purpose of the Equal Protection Clause but fairly
flies in their face.' 146 Even if the Court had stronger textual-historical
justifications, it would become entangled in remedial problems.147 There
is no consensus over which wants are "just wants"; the real battle is over
l1 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971).
-4 See, e.g., Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 659 (1979); Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the fourteenth
amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights:
One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 692 (1973).
- Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to
the Welfare State, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 741, 753-54 (1979) [hereinafter Winter].
"I Id. at 748-49.
146 Winter, Poverty, Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SuP. CT.
REV. 41, 43 (1972).
147 Id. at 70-71.
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relative deprivation, not complete deprivation. The Court would have a
great deal of difficulty managing its welfare system.
148
The liberal reply, at least as seen in the two of the most important
constitutional works of the 1980s, Professor Ely's Democracy and
Distrust149 and Professor Tribe's second edition of American Constitutional
Law, 15° has been restrained. Both scholars commence with approaches
that might lead to judicial aid for the poor, but hedge when faced with
actually making substantive commitments. Professor Ely made "repre-
sentation reinforcement" his constitutional lodestone; the court should
only try to facilitate the democratic process. "Representation reinforce-
ment" both explained and limited the Court's famous contemporary ex-
position of the scope of judicial review expressed in footnote four of Car-
olene Products. That footnote, as interpreted by Ely, only permitted the
Court to cure deficiencies in the democratic process. Ely never repudiated
the Burger Court's refusal to consider the poor a "discrete and insular
minority," deserving heightened scrutiny as a suspect class,"" even
though "discrete" and "insular" are sufficiently ambiguous adjectives that
they could have been used to justify a contrary interpretation under Ely's
basic principle of representation reinforcement. Hungry, uneducated peo-
ple cannot fully participate in the electoral process.
Professor Tribe found Ely's exclusive reliance on process - "represen-
tation reinforcement" - to be puzzling because it was arbitrary, inadequate
and ultimately substantive, particularly as applied by Ely.152 Professor
Tribe's treatise offered three abstractions that might trigger judicial help
for the poor. First, he argued that one of the Constitution's unifying
concerns is to protect "outsiders":
141 Before he was a judge, Robert Bork made similar arguments, but in his
characteristically blunter style. The title of his article indicates the nature of his
opposition: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution. See
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 695 (1979). According to Bork, certain interpretations of the Constitution
are not simply wrong or excessive, they are "impossible." Bork was thus implying
that he had found a determinate test that can test constitutional solutions as if
they were mathematical problems.
149 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
150 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55.
15, In his classic work, Ely noted that the Burger Court has not been sympa-
thetic to the poor, J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 148-50 (1980). In his only
other extended reference to the poor, he observed they do not fit well under suspect
classification analysis since "their problems are not often problems of classifi-
cation to begin with." Id. at 162. Rather than consider that the poor's inability
to get easily under the "discrete and insular minority" standard may call into
question the justification for using that standard as a primary tool, Ely chose to
delve no further into the issue of the poor.
152 Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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(Tihe core concerns of equal protection, Article IV [Privileges
and Immunities], and the commerce clause, are remarkably
similar: all address the problems that occur when governmen-
tal action inflicts injury upon outsiders- whether geographical
outsiders, as in the case of burden imposed on persons from
other states; or political outsiders, as in the case of disadvan-
tages visited upon minorities insulated from other groups
within the state itself; or psychological outsiders, as in the case
of actions adverse to persons whom those in power regard as
different or inferior.153
The poor, particularly poor children, are both political and psychological
outsiders. Tribe also discovered a more directly relevant value underpin-
ning all fourteenth amendment doctrine, "anti-subjugation. ' ' 154 Poor chil-
dren are presently the most subjugated group in our society; their share
of the nation's wealth has diminished steadily over the past twenty years.
Such systematic subjugation and deprivation places them within Tribe's
third theme: the Court has a duty to protect "perennial losers in the
political struggle."1 55 One could easily conclude that the poor, particularly
poor children, are perennial losers, even if some members of that group
escape. 56 One does not have to be a Marxist to believe that many poor
children are trapped in a cycle of poverty. Yet, like Ely, Tribe refused to
advocate that the Court order substantive commitments for the poor be-
cause the Court would face insurmountable remedial and causation prob-
lems: "the affirmative governmental duty to meet basic human needs
cannot always be enforced directly -apart from ... special situations ....
Instead, it will usually be necessary to reflect affirmative duties less
directly-through governmental obligations to provide procedural safe-
guards when the deprivation of welfare, wages, or household goods is
involved .... 1157 This puzzling move repeats Ely's substitution of process
for substance.15S
1
53 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 545.
1" Id. at 1514-21.
15
5 Id. at 1454.
6 The ability to eventually escape from the plight that generally affects one
subgroup does not prevent a finding that that group deserves equal protection.
Otherwise, blacks and women would no longer need equal protection because
many of them have become very successful in our society.
1
57 L. TaIBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 1336, 1375.
' Professor Tribe also retreats to process when he proposes at the end of his
treatise that the Court's next major development should be to expand "structuraljustice", to determine who should make what decisions within the constitutional
framework. Id. at 1673-1687. Structural analysis, which looks at the flow of power
within the entire Constitution, is process writ large. For example, it does not
mandate any particular substantive results for the poor. On the other hand, one
should not and cannot ignore the Constitution's structure. One reason this article
suggests more intensified judicial review of state action than of Congressional
action is Madison's argument that tyranny by faction is much less likely in large
representative groups, such as Congress, than in smaller groups, such as state
legislatures.
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As Tribe observed in his treatise, 159 even Professor Michelman, who
made the most powerful argument on behalf of providing significant sub-
stantive relief to poor people under the fourteenth amendment, qualified
his argument that the Court must satisfy "just needs" in this affluent
society. According to Michelman, definitional and remedial problems may
limit judicial intervention to the elimination of total deprivations and/or
protection of basic services that already exist. 160
Several liberal lawyers have leapt over the judicial competency and
legitimacy problems, proposing significant wealth redistribution under
the equal protection clause. Attorney William Taylor has argued that the
existing isolation of the poor, particularly poor black children, violates
the underlying goal of Brown v. Board of Education: providing equal
opportunity for all children of all races to succeed.
161 Professor Charles
Black has derived a constitutional right to livelihood from the Declaration
of Independence, the preamble of the Constitution, and certain parts of
the rest of the Constitution.162 Professor Edelman has relied upon the
fourteenth amendment to form the judicial duty to protect the poor:
an obligation which has been implicit in our constitutional
structure all along, or at least since the American polity has
had enough resources to share its wealth more equitably; and
... an obligation which has been acquired as a consequence of
the government's historic and continuing complicity in eco-
nomic arrangements that foreseeably resulted in the current
maldistribution. The first is a substantive due process argu-
ment; the second is an equal protection theory.1
63
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars'6 frequently distinguish between
forms of liberalism, providing valuable insights. For instance, Professor
Simon, who is affiliated with the CLS school, discussed how property
rights and contract rights, metaphors for welfare benefits, prevailed over
an entitlement theory of welfare rights because the common law meta-
phors were more consistent with dominant individualistic rhetoric.
165 The
rights theories were used by politicians such as President Roosevelt and
by the legal profession, while the entitlement imagery emerged out of
159 L. TREBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 1337, n. 50.
- Michelman, supra note 143, at 997-1003, 1005-07, 1010-11, 1013-15.
161 Taylor, supra note 25, at 1703.
162 Black, supra note 25, at 1105.
'6 Edelman, supra note 25, at 5.
11 The Critical Legal Studies Movement, which has attracted many left-wing
academics, offers little guidance or solace at its most abstract level because it
links modern liberalism with contemporary conservative perspectives:
People who think of themselves as deontological rights theorists and those
who are openly utilitarian are linked; anarchic libertarians and New Deal
apologists are treated as forming a school because, CLS proponents believe,
they share certain fundamental attitudes and rhetorical styles that over-
whelm their undeniably real differences.
M. KELLMAN, A GUIDE To CRITIcAL LEGAL STUDIEs 3 (1987).
5 Simon, supra note 135, at 1432.
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the social work profession. Simon concluded that the decision to use com-
mon law metaphors cost the poor, even though its advocates had good
motives and even though many of them chose that approach not because
they believed it, but because they thought it would be more politically
acceptable. The property and contracts metaphors politically isolated the
welfare recipients from the Social Security recipients, who had at least
paid some money into the system. 166
Simon's level of analysis only leads a litigator for the poor so far. The
doctrinal counterattack to existing caselaw and to existing theoretical
objections still needs to be formulated. If it is to have any chance of success
with the existing court, that attack should directly respond to the ar-
guments ofjudicial restraint, incorporating those countervailing concerns
to some degree. Any such doctrinal compromise will probably fail to some
degree, just as the property-rights metaphors also did not fulfill all of
their advocates' hopes. It is easy to demonstrate how past compromises
produced failures or incomplete successes. But those criticisms should not
deter us from making similar compromises now, such as the one this
article offers. At the very least, the process of proposing and analyzing
new doctrinal compromises makes one more sensitive to the competing
values that influence existing law.
Underlying all these concerns and issues is the jurisprudential disa-
greement over the meaning of the phrase "equal protection," both as a
general proposition and as applied in the fourteenth amendment. 16 7 That
debate, in turn, revolves around the concept of "equality," a concept that
is at the core of most contemporary political theories. The Constitution
mandates equality, but the content of that equality is open to a never-
ending debate. Formal equality, the existing conservative ideal, requires
that the rules be applied evenly; certain rules, such as race or sex laws,
are presumptively unconstitutional because they give one group a per-
petual and excessive advantage over another group for no legitimate
reason. The primary criteria for distributing rewards and penalties should
be merit-the primary mechanism, the market. Formal equality is highly
suspicious of laws that appear to be stigmatic or which are premised upon
inappropriate stereotypes, laws which injure people for traits over which
they have no control (with the notable exception of intelligence).16 Other
visions of equality-economic equality, fulfillment of basic needs, com-
pensation for past societal injuries and equality of opportunity-all re-
quire affirmative relief, albeit in differing amounts and to different
groups. These other visions of equality are more difficult to reduce to
11 Id. at 1466, 1504. Simon also criticized Charles Reich's New Property met-
aphor; characterizing welfare as a property right tended to encourage proceduralprotections for property, but did not increase substantive relief, because the idea
of property implies the status quo. Id. at 1488. In other words, the welfare recip-ients have a right to whatever they are receiving, but nothing more.
167 See, e.g., Michelman, The Meanings of Legal Equality, 3 HARv. BLACK LET-
TER L.J. 24 (1986); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537
(1982).
1
68 T. NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 104 (1979).
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judicial standards because they are more empirically based. It is easy to
prove that a statute facially punishes someone for being black, but it is
far more difficult to determine when a child has been deprived of "equal
opportunity."
The debate over equality determines the basic structure of society. It
is an issue that bedevils political scientists and philosophers, not just
judges and legal academics. The philosopher Thomas Nagel has written
that three competing conceptions of moral equality explain the differences
between economic egalitarianism, utilitarianism and individual rights:
"[The conflict between these three beliefs] can also be viewed as a dispute
about how people should be treated equally, not about whether they
should be. The three views share an assumption of moral equality between
persons, but differ in their interpretations of it."'1 9 Nagel explains that
utilitarianism treats people equally via a form of majoritarianism: "The
moral equality of utilitarianism consists in letting each person's interests
contribute in the same way to determining what in sum would be best
overall. ' 170 The individual rights theories give a person a limited veto
over how he may be treated: "The moral equality of persons under this
conception is their equal claim against each other not to be interfered
with in specified ways. '171 Economic egalitarianism blends the outcome
perspective of utilitarianism with individual rights' analysis: "The moral
equality of egalitarianism consists in taking into account the interests
of each person, subject to the same system of priorities of urgency, in
determining what would be best overall."''v The neverending, everchang-
ing dispute over the meaning of equality is certainly too important and
too complex a question to be left exclusively to the Supreme Court.
VI. DILUTING EQUAL PROTECTION TO HELP POOR CHILDREN
Before explaining how Congressional dilution of certain equal protec-
tion decisions could provide additional relief to poor children without
undermining the existing Constitutional order, I want to make an un-
derlying belief explicit. If I were a Supreme Court Justice, writing on a
clean slate, I would find that every person has a "fundamental right" to
have his or her "fundamental needs" met. This Article attempts to in-
tegrate that position into the existing caselaw without completely re-
jecting the premises that generated those opinions, particularly concerns
about judicial competence and majoritarianism. This Article's conception
of equal protection is a compromise, a lawyer's attempt to obtain what
little may be available.
173
l61 Id. at 111. The fourteenth amendment's text does not determine which of
the three conceptions of equality should prevail. It does not mandate "equal rights"
or "equal utility." It requires "equal protection," which could include affirmative
relief as well as individual rights.
170 Id. at 113.
171 Id. at 114.
172 Id. at 118.
173 It is unlikely that any of the five Justices who decided Kadrmas would make
any significant efforts to provide additional constitutional protection to the poor.
One cannot be sure, however. Furthermore, some of those Justices, as well as
some of the more liberal Justices, may leave the Court within the foreseeable
future.
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For the reader who may have become weary or saddened by the previous
description of the "devolution" of the constitutional rights of the poor,
this Article shall repeat verbatim the "limited dilution" proposal pre-
sented in the Introduction: the Supreme Court should aggressively ex-
pand its definitions of equal protection and of due process, as applied to
the states, by sometimes explicitly giving Congress the power to override
some judicial decisions pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
A. The Mechanics of Limited Dilution
The Supreme Court would have three options in response to any plain-
tiff's allegations that a state law violated equal protection.1 4 The court
could decide: (1) the plaintiff had no valid claim; (2) the state's violation
of equal protection was so egregious that Congress could not override the
Court's decision; or (3) the state violated equal protection but Congress
could reconsider that holding under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. For instance, the Court should continue to uphold the constitu-
tionality of a state deposit requirement for bottles, but not for cans,
because such a law is an economic regulation and because the state can
proceed a step at a time to protect its environment. 17 Relying on Brown
v. Board of Education, the Court should and would use the second option
to hold that any law mandating school segregation is an irreversible
violation of equal protection. However, the Court could now find that a
state law overtly injuring poor children-by requiring them to pay fees
for school bus transportation, for example-violates equal protection. In
fact, it could ignore the hostile precedent of Kadrmas 76 because that case
was based upon the assumption that any favorable decision would be
permanent judicial doctrine, changeable only by constitutional amend-
ment. The Court would state in its opinion that Congress could reverse
174 In fact, the Court does have a third option under existing law. It could hold
that Congress could reconsider any "facts" because of its superior fact-finding
competence, see Brennan's discussion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 249
n.31 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This poten-
tially troublesome exception has not been utilized by Congress, which is one
indication that Congress might be somewhat deferential if the Supreme Court
made some "dilution" decisions.
The existing distinction is in some ways more disturbing than this Article's
proposal. For example, could Congress find that integration actually harms black
students, which would partially undermine Brown v. Board of Education, which
was partially based upon sociological data? Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).175The Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting plastic milk cartons in
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 reh'g denied, 108 S.Ct. 2481(1988). 450 U.S. 1027 (1981).
176 108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988).
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the decision pursuant to section 5. One would hope, of course, that Con-
gress would usually defer to the Court's initial finding of unconstitution-
ality. That deference, combined with legislative inertia, would permit
many section 5 opinions to stand.
Nevertheless, Congress could pass a law, which must be presented to
the President, 77 explicitly overruling a designated section 5 opinion. Con-
gress would have no power to expand its bill beyond the facts of the
original case. For instance, it could not pass a bill stating that the Su-
preme Court can never again consider any poverty issues to be equal
protection issues. Otherwise, Congress would be making an initial de-
termination of the constitutionality of an individual rights issue, thereby
violating Marbury v. Madison.17 Furthermore, some poverty-based
rights, such as the indigent's right to a free counsel in a capital 
case,179
remain nondilutable since failure to provide a lawyer in such a case is
so unreasonable that neither Congress nor the states can so proceed. Such
a maneuver would also defeat one of the purposes of the proposal: to allow
the Court and Congress to engage in a meaningful dialogue about difficult
constitutional problems. If either side can quickly prevail over the other,
the discussion would terminate. For example, if Congress held that states
could charge bus fees to indigents, thereby reinstating Kadrmas, the
Court could still void a subsequent state law that made poor children pay
for their text-books. The Court would clearly be asking Congress to re-
consider its prior decision to revive Kadrmas. Eventually, of course, Con-
gress could seal off an entire area of potential equal protection rights.
But at least the issue would have been clearly presented to the people.
All of us would be more directly responsible for the treatment of school-
children throughout the country. One of the functions of law, including
constitutional law, is to force the populace to be aware of and responsible
for the impacts of their choices.
B. The Substance of Dilution
The Court will have a difficult problem determining which of the three
responses applies in a given case. Making such distinctions, however,
would not be a novel enterprise. The Court already struggles when de-
177 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The
Supreme Court held Congress could use its legislative powers to override a de-
cision by the Attorney General that an alien should not be deported unless Con-
gress passed a bill through both houses and presented it to the President so he
or she could decide whether or not to veto the act.
178 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
119 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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termining who should prevail under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Marshall has argued for many years that the Court actually utilizes a
sliding scale to ascertain the fourteenth amendment's coverage: "[The
Court] has focused upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against
of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and the state interests
asserted in support of the classification."1O In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,"" Marshall noted that the plurality decision, which re-
quired a city to grant a building permit to a group of mentally retarded
citizens, could not be explained by the plurality's use of the highly def-
erential rational purpose test. According to Marshall, the plurality used
the tools of heightened scrutiny when it closely scrutinized the record
and put the burden of proof on the state by refusing to accept certain
objectives or fears as "rational".182
Under the proposed test, the Court would not just follow Justice Mar-
shall's test, which consists of assessing the impact of the state action on
the plaintiff, the nature of the plaintiff class, and the asserted state
interests.183 The Court would also consider the "justiciability" problems
that encourage judicial restraint: deference to the elected branches,
changing data, difficulty in forming remedies, problems in determining
the impact of the policy or of proposed alternatives, and political impact.
These factors, which may have prevented judicial intervention in the past,
remain relevant, but are now surmountable. Congress, one of the two
nationally elected branches, could correct any judicial errors or any sig-
nificant deviations from the majority's will. 1 The Court would no longer
be caught in the stagnant pool of existing equal protection doctrine. The
Court could take more chances, knowing it was no longer creating per-
manent constitutional definitions of equality by itself.
If the Court adopted this article's redefinition of section five, all pre-
existing doctrine denying plaintiffs their equal protection claims would
180 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has recently adopted a similar balancing
test to determine a statute's reasonableness:
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic' questions. What
class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tradition
of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by
the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifiesthe disparate treatment? In most cases the answer to these questions will
tell us whether the statute has a 'rational basis.'City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 453-55 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
'
82 Id. at 459.
' Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
I' Of course any Congressional action would either have to be approved by
the President or override the President's veto, see I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919(1983).
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be partially destabilized. Until Richmond and Metro, equal protection
cases were decided upon the assumption that any decision favoring plain-
tiffs permanently and equally bound the States and the federal govern-
ment.18 5 Consequently, all decisions that refused to create equal protection
rights against the States could be reconsidered since this new doctrinal
remedy is available, a remedy that undercuts many of the reservations
that initially generated those adverse decisions. The Court can reconsider
both the general contours of equal protection, which groups or traits
deserve intensified scrutiny and the specific holdings of the cases, and
how equal protection should be applied to the facts of a given case. Yet
those cases which found that governments violated equal protection would
remain unthreatened. Those decisions were based upon the assumption
that the Court must have the final word in that particular situation; the
Court has already rejected the competing concerns about remedial prob-
lems or deference to the majority. Thus, when the Court tries to determine
if a right is dilutable or not, it retains a large body of undisturbed doctrine,
as a baseline, to help it decide which rights should be completely immune
from legislative reconsideration.
The Court could also correct some of its existing doctrinal confusion.
For example, a plurality held in Cleburne that a community did not even
have a "rational purpose" for denying a group home permit to some men-
tally retarded citizens. Apparently fears about how the mentally retarded
might behave - and/or of lowered property values - were "irrational."
Irrespective of the test chosen, the Court did not intend for its decision
to be reconsidered by Congress. The Court assumed it was making per-
manent constitutional law. Consequently, it might reorganize cases in-
volving the mentally retarded as a mixture of "strict scrutiny" decisions,
untouchable by Congress, "intermediate scrutiny" decisions, some of
which would be reversible by Congress, and "rational purpose" decisions,
which would always validate the existing law. Cleburne would represent
a baseline in the first category. As the plurality noted in Cleburne, some
specific regulation of the mentally retarded may be necessary, if only for
their protection. 8 6 For example, the Court would have more difficulty in
determining the constitutionality of a law that prohibited drivers' licenses
to people who had a low I.Q. In such a case, it might either defer or make
an initial finding of irrationality, reversible by Congress. Distinguishing
between benign paternalism and oppression can be difficult; the Court
could and should pass final resolution of some of these problems to Con-
gress.
185 Equal protection requirements apply to the federal government through the
equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
"I Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-443 (1984).
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C. Applying the New Doctrine to Impoverished Children
1. Doctrinal Reorganization
The first part of this article was dedicated to showing how poor children
could make a strong case that they should at least receive dilutable equal
protection. They are politically weak. They are suffering through no fault
of their own. Their needs are extreme, insufficiently met, yet partially
resolvable by governmental action. This country has frequently exploited
the poor, and is now relegating many of their children to squalid, dan-
gerous ghettos. In short, poor children are currently society's biggest set
of innocent losers. In a few years, it may be another group.
Assuming that the Court agreed, for any number of reasons, to use this
new tool to aid impoverished children, how might this doctrinal shift
actually operate? This Article shall outline one possible solution to the
fit between youth poverty and equal protection. Recall that virtually all
prior cases finding equal protection rights on behalf of the poor remain
nondilutable.1' 7 Because application of the doctrine brings the Court ever
more overtly into the social policy arena, the article shall then consider
some of the conservative sociological arguments that might be used
against the proposed extensions.
The Court could find that some rights of the poor are undilutable, even
though it had previously ruled against plaintiffs in similar cases. For
instance, it might completely reject statutes that facially discriminate
against poor children (or the poor), thereby overruling James v. Val-
tierra,1 m which upheld a state law which facially discriminated against
the poor by establishing procedural hurdles to the creation of low-income
housing. States could not pass laws that make it uniquely difficult for
poor people, as a group, to participate in the political process. At least as
a disabling trait, poverty would once again become constitutionally ir-
relevant, as contemplated in Edwards v. California.89 One justification
for the James decision was the fear of completely constitutionalizing the
poverty issue. That concern is less acute if most of the difficult poverty
issues ultimately can be resolved by Congress. But a permanent, bright
line should be drawn against using poverty as an explicit disabling trait.
The Court might decide not to extend nondilutable equal protection
beyond that bright line. On the other hand, a sympathetic and creative
Court could find that all "total deprivations" of "fundamental needs" of
any subgroup of poor children are also unreviewable violations of equal
protection. Such a principle could be derived from Plyler, which held that
states cannot preclude one group of children, the children of illegal aliens,
from attending public schools that are open to all other children. 190 Such
187 Plyler may already be dilutable under Congress' "plenary" power to regulate
immigration. Thus its status has not been completely resolved by this article.
18 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
189 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
190 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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violations are egregious, easy to prove, and easy to cure. The Court simply
orders the state to extend the desperately needed service to the group of
children who do not receive it. The Court would require the states to
provide poor children the same basic resources they make available to
all other children. States should not be able to isolate sub-groups of poor
children, who already are becoming more and more cut off from the rest
of society. Under such a broad interpretation of Plyler, the Court could
reverse Kadrmas, which permitted the state to charge some poor children
for school bus fees while not charging other children (rich and poor) for
the same service.191
The Court might permit Congress to review any judicial decision re-
quiring the states to provide "basic needs" above "total deprivation". The
proof and remedial problems become far more severe. Plaintiffs can easily
show total deprivation, but will find no self-evident standard that deter-
mines the level of aid that satisfies basic needs or wants. For example,
in Rodriquez the plaintiffs received a minimally adequate free education.
The Court could hold that states must provide equal resources to all public
schools, thereby overruling Rodriquez, but also hold that decision could
be reversed by Congress. 192 If the Court did not want to expand Plyler at
all, it could initially prevent states from charging fees to poor children
for such public services as school bus transportation, schoolbooks,
193 school
expenses, school lunches, and zoos. In fact, the Kadrmas case, which
upheld charging school bus fees to indigent children, provides a perfect
example of when and how this dilutable doctrine might apply. The Court
might have been more willing to strike down that brutal state law if it
knew Congress could intervene.
Statutes that have a strong adverse impact on poor children could also
be more carefully scrutinized. Statutes that harshly limit benefits while
simultaneously undermining families, such as the law in Dandridge
which required a new baby in a large poor family to try to live off of its
siblings' paltry welfare benefits, could also be struck down as a dilutable
deprivations of equal protection. On the other hand, the Court should be
wary of extending any heightened scrutiny to the state's support and
toleration of the general effects of the market.
Remedial problems will present severe, but not insurmountable prob-
lems. The Court could either use the doctrine sparingly, to eliminate such
cruelties as charging fees for school buses, or it could try to significantly
reallocate resources by rigorously enforcing the right to "basic needs."
For instance, the Court could frame an injunction establishing a right to
'Ol Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
192 Not that equal spending in education will create miracles: "During 1982-
83 school year, Chicago spent $3,574 per pupil. That was about $9 more than the
average per pupil spending in suburban school districts and about $300 more
than the averages in DuPage and Lake Counties." CHICAGO TMUNE, MILLSTONE,
supra note 36, at 143.
193 Carnes v. Kentucky, 429 U.S. 1049, (1977) (certioriari denied).
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"basic needs" by taking the federal government's poverty line as a base-line. It could either use that amount or some percentage of it as a man-
datory minimum, creating a means based guaranteed annual income as
its standard for evaluating poverty claims. The Court would also have to
create a sliding scale so that those who work for low wages would notlose their incentive to work. The Court might also order the states to
adjust welfare amounts to take inflation or deflation into account, even
engaging in state by state or area by area analysis of costs of living. Such
an inquiry would be difficult, but would be no more challenging than
determining when a state legislature has improperly used gerrymander-
ing to determine electoral districts-a responsibility the Court has re-
cently placed upon the federal court system. 9 4
2. Policy Considerations
How is the Court to use its new discretion under section 5 when there
is no agreement over the causes of poverty, and thus over the cures?
Determining, much less isolating, the causes of individual, group or so-
cietal decline is an extremely difficult enterprise. Problems of causation
in social science and history dwarf the issues of causation that usually
trouble lawyers. Some will blame the individual for his or her poverty,
others the economy for not providing enough decent jobs, others the cul-
ture, and others the poor person's "cultural inheritance."''
A major justification for the dilution concept is social need. The country
is suffering from severe social problems-particularly the increasing iso-
lation and devastation of the poor-which do not easily lend themselves
to permanent constitutional resolution, but which could benefit from ajudicial perspective. But overtly opening the door to social theory allows
the admission of some unwanted views, at least from the contemporary
liberal perspective. The Court might prefer to adopt the views of con-
servative sociologist Charles Murray, concluding that even if section 5
should be reinterpreted to give groups such as poor children enhanced
protection, it should not increase welfare benefits. Murray had concluded
that such benefits injure the poor by destroying their incentive to work. 196
The Court might accept Jane Jacobs' diagnosis that handsome welfare
benefits undermine the entire culture, not just the lives of the poor: "If[welfare programs] are unremitting, they too drain city earnings unrem-
ittingly. If they are at all generous, then if anything they are even more
voracious feeders on cities than military programs."' 97
Davis v. Bandemer, 487 U.S. 109 (1986).
195 T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 29 (1984).
David Hume expressed similar views over two hundred years ago: "Giving
alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems to carry relief tothe distressed and indigent: but when we observe the encouragement thence
arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as a
weakness than a virtue", D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS 13 (1777).
197 J. JACOBS, CrTrEs AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 191 (1985).
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Charles Murray may be correct in arguing that providing any welfare
benefits, much less generous welfare benefits, is counterproductive at the
aggregate level. Even one of his critics, William Wilson, conceded that
welfare cripples some families by allowing young girls with babies to
leave their homes at a very early age.1 98 On the other hand, Wilson pointed
out that Murray does not explain why poverty has increased even though
the real value of welfare, adjusted for inflation, has dropped significantly
over the past fifteen years. 199 Wilson also noted that Murray ignores the
impact of much higher unemployment on the poor.
2°0 Wilson argued that
welfare did not increase poverty, but rather that poverty would have
increased much more without welfare. 20 1 Senator Moynihan cited a study
showing that the number of children actually on AFDC has remained
relatively constant during the last decade,
20 2 and that different levels of
welfare benefits in different states did not affect family structure.
20 3
Nevertheless, Murray's interpretation of the data cannot be completely
refuted; the only way to test his hypothesis/proposal would have been to
eliminate welfare during the past twenty years.
20 4 If welfare were elim-
inated now, causing disaster, Murray might claim that the catastrophe
would not have struck if welfare had been eliminated earlier. Ideology
can usually explain away facts.
Certainly a Supreme Court Justice, or even a Congressman or legal
academic, will be hardpressed to be sure that he or she understands the
"s W. WILSON, supra note 27, at 186.
191 Id. at 17.
200 Id.
201 See e.g. J. SCHWARZ, AMERICAN'S HIDDEN SUCCESS (1988).
202 D. MOYNIHAN, note 32, at 130.
202 Id. at 136.
The vigorous debate among social scientists over the causes and cures for
poverty can intimidate lawyers into deference. Consider the following formula
from a recent series of papers reviewing experimental programs that authorized
guaranteed annual incomes: "[A] simple way to represent the treatment is: H =
a + b, T + b2 (DG) + b3 (Dt) + gZ + dX + e, Burtless, A Work Response to a
Guaranteed Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence, in LESSONS FROM THE
INCOME MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS 32 (A. Munnell, ed., 1987). The experiments
were criticized for not always having control groups to avoid self-selection, Mun-
nell, An Overview, id. at 20. One scholar criticized the samples for being too small,
but did conclude that "the experiments did not stabilize families and ... may
have been destabilizing." Ellwood, Discussion, id. at 98. The program was attacked
for being dominated by economists, Nathan, Lessons for Future Public Policy and
Research, id. at 254.
There was dispute over the program's impact. One analyst found that the
program did not destabilize two parent families which already had children, Cain,
The Income Maintenance Experiments and the Issues of Marital Stability and
Family Composition, id. at 90., in apparent disagreement with the finding that
the program did split up two parent families, Hall, Discussion, id. at 58-59. The
experiments also had unforeseen benefits: the recipients' becoming better edu-
cated, an improved birth rate and improved nutrition, Bradbury, Discussion, id.
at 125. Yet the long-run impact of such a program could not, by definition, be
clear since the experiment lasted for a short period of time, Burtless, id. at 46.
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current state of the underclass, which has gone through yet another wave
of deterioration caused by the proliferation of youth gangs selling "crack,"
a highly addictive form of cocaine. Even a significant re-allocation of
resources will not eliminate the misery and the destructive social patterns
that currently exist. As Jane Jacobs pointed out, Marshall Plan funds
benefited certain parts of Europe far more than other parts, depending
upon the underlying strengths and weaknesses of the area aided.205
Thomas Sowell has argued that cultural inheritance is more important
than legal structures: "the reality of group patterns that transcend any
given society cannot be denied. ' '20
A simple way remains out of this utilitarian quandary. One can simply
believe that individual children should not live without basic necessities
in this affluent society, whatever the potential costs and benefits. No
matter what this society does, it may drift into decline, with the brunt
of the deterioration falling on the poor. But whatever our future may be,
we must reaffirm our commitment to and love for our young by not sub-jecting them to brutal social experiments, such as those proposed by
Murray. Such a moral commitment may prevent the decline; but even ifit does not, we shall have affirmed a moral vision of human community.
Professor John Finnis has argued that certain goods are self-evident to
a reasonable person, 20 7 just as certain bads need explanation.2o Onehardly need explain why taking reasonable care of one's young is an
essential part of decent human nature and of a decent society. Refusing
to feed and to clothe children needs a better explanation than that it may
improve the lot of some of those who survive the suffering, even the braindamage, that would definitely result from such a policy. At some point,
certain means are immoral, whatever the aggregate benefits.
Consequently, Murray's analysis may fail on at least four levels: as an
accurate reading of the data, as the basis for his extreme solution of
eliminating welfare, as a utilitarian solution to the elimination of the
suffering of poverty, and as a deontological proposition of how to treat
children. But the existing Court, of course, will almost certainly refuse
to change its current doctrine, particularly if it believes all of its decisions
will become a permanent, unamendable part of the Constitution. To most
of the Justices, the debate over poverty is a political one that should be
resolved legislatively. Thinkers like Murray and Sowell provide addi-
tional justifications for not helping the poor, or at least doubts about how
to help the poor. Even if most of the Justices don't believe they are actually
helping the poor by not helping them, they can believe that the issue is
sufficiently complex and political that the judiciary should not become
involved.
205 J. JACOBS, supra note 197, at 8.206 T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 29 (1984).
-07J. F NIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 63-73 (1980).
28 Id. at 209.
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Such deference to changing sociological theory and to underlying po-
litical currents is less justifiable if the Court adopts this Article's proposal.
It need not worry about permanently constitutionalizing its responses to
the poverty problem. It can aggressively protect the poor, by requiring
free textbooks and free school-bus rides, for instance, without fearing that
it will completely and permanently alter the existing structure. It can
lead, but not dominate.
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A DOUBLE STANDARD
AND OF LIMITED DILUTION
As noted in the Introduction, Justice O'Connor made no detailed effort
in Richmond or in Metro to justify her double standard of being more
deferential to Congressional affirmative action plans than to similar state
plans. This section will defend the double standard and demonstrate that
it supports the Article's proposal for "limited dilution."
A. The Double Standard and Limited Dilution do not
Conflict with Marbury v. Madison
Richmond's creation of a double standard arguably undermines the
most important case in constitutional law, Marbury v. Madison209 by po-
tentially giving Congress the power to reverse the Court on constitutional
issues and the power to define certain individual constitutional rights. A
more contemporary, directly relevant restatement of the Marbury theory
ofjudicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation appeared in Shapiro
v. Thompson: "Congress may not authorize the states to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. '210 Marbury, however, does not require the Court to
always retain a trump over Congress on every constitutional issue.
211
Marbury only requires that the Court initially interpret the constitution
in all cases raising constitutional issues. For example, Congress can au-
thorize state actions that the court had previously found unconstitutional
in such areas as the dormant commerce clause. The Supreme Court may
decide, under the political question doctrine or in its interpretation of
"standing," that the Constitution authorizes or permits the other branches
to resolve particular issues. In other words, Marbury does not always
preclude another branch from having the last word on specific constitu-
tional issues. The Court must have the first word-the jurisdictional
power to decide who finally decides which constitutional issues. The Court
29 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969).
211 Professor Wechsler argued that Marbury only gave the federal courts ju-
risdiction to determine if they have jurisdiction to resolve a case on its merits:
"[The federal courts] must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their
jurisdiction and in so doing must give effect to the supreme law of the land."
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 1965 COL. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1965).
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retains that power under the proposal because it initially determines
which of its fourteenth amendment decisions can be reviewed by Congress
and which fourteenth amendment rights are never dilutable. It would
create the double standard, and subsequently determine the scope and
impact of that standard.
The Shapiro quotation, focusing on the fourteenth amendment, is more
directly on point. The Shapiro Court had held that Congress had no more
power than the States to require a one year waiting period for welfare
benefits.2 12 Nevertheless, Shapiro does not determine the full meaning of
the equal protection clause. Shapiro only stated that neither Congress
nor the States can make that particular residency law, a holding which
would remain unaffected by the new doctrine. Under the dilution doctrine,
Congress would not violate equal protection nor would it authorize the
states to violate equal protection if the Court had previously determined
that Congress can authorize the states to engage in the activity that the
Court had initially found to be a violation of equal protection. The Shapiro
statement is sufficiently circular that it supports both sides of this debate.
If one concludes that Congress can never narrow a judicial equal protec-
tion case or can never be held to a different standard than the states,
then Congress will always violate equal protection if it violates these
principles. If one decides that the Court may create a double standard
for some equal protection issues, giving more power to Congress than to
the States to define Equal Protection, then Congress will not have violated
equal protection whenever it uses that power to reverse the Court. And
those predicates, of course, are the bone of contention. They cannot be
answered by the conclusion. The whole point of this Article is to discuss
what equal protection should mean, not to suggest that Congress has any
power under section 5 to violate equal protection once the proper defi-
nitions of equal protection and section 5 are agreed upon.
Even if Marbury and Shapiro only stand for the proposition that Con-
gress cannot violate the Constitution as interpreted by the Court, they
remain directly relevant if the proposed expansion of section 5 is hope-
lessly inconsistent with existing section 5 doctrine. In other words, if the
Court has already interpreted section 5 to preclude this Article's sug-
gestion, then either the proposal is invalid or else that prior doctrine has
to be altered. We shall see that this doctrine does co-exist with existing
doctrine, albeit somewhat uncomfortably.
B. Are "Limited Dilution" and Richmond's Double Standard
Consistent with Existing Section 5 Law?
Congressional efforts to enhance voting rights have been a focal point
of section 5 litigation. In 1966, the Court twice upheld Congressional
212 394 U.S. at 642.
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statutes designed to protect minority voters. Chief Justice Warren con-
cluded in South Carolina v. Katzenbach213 that Congress has greater dis-
cretion than the Court in devising remedies to violations of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments. Specifically, Congress has the power under
section 5 to outlaw literacy tests, even though the Supreme Court had
previously held that literacy tests were constitutional in Lassiter v. Nor-
thampton Election Board.214 The Court's distinction between rights and
remedies should not obscure the fact that Congress effectively overruled
a prior Supreme Court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Ad-
mittedly South Carolina is distinguishable from this Article's proposal
because Congress expanded the scope of equal protection, but the case
did establish the threshold principle that Congress has some independent
power to interpret the fourteenth amendment. Instead of waiting for
Congress to redefine the fourteenth amendment more aggressively, the
Court would be initially suggesting to Congress how it should use its
broad powers under section 5.
21
5
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 6 the Court allowed Congress to alter existing
language requirements for voting so that Puerto Ricans who did not speak
or read English could vote. The Supreme Court upheld similar Congres-
sional expansions of equal protection beyond existing caselaw in Oregon
v. Mitchell21 7 and Rome v. United States.218 But the Oregon court also
found limits to Congressional power under section 5. Congress could not
require states to give eighteen year-olds the right to vote in state and
local elections. That limitation on Congressional power over the states
does not preclude Congressional power to revive a subset of state powers
previously struck down by the Court. In Oregon, the states are being
protected from Congress- under the proposal, Congress is helping the
states.
Several members of the Court have permitted the use of Congressional
power outside the voting context. The majority partially relied upon sec-
tion 5 to justify a Congressional affirmative action scheme in Fullilove v.
Klutznik.219 The affirmative action dilemma demonstrates the need for a
flexible interpretation of section 5. One hopes that the need for affirmative
action will diminish over the years. But who should determine when
affirmative action programs should exist; how long they should last; and
213 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
214 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
215 This technique has the same virtues as the dormant commerce clause doc-
trine. Most individuals have great difficulty getting a Congressional law passed.
A lawsuit is quicker, more responsive to individual facts, and promptly able to
eliminate new violations. Thus the technique would empower impoverished in-
dividuals to battle states without having to first go to Congress.
216 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
217 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
218 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
219 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Chief Justice Burger cited both Katzenbach v. Morgan
and Oregon v. Mitchell to support the following: "A review of our cases persuades
us that the objectives of the MBE program are within the power of Congress
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who they should cover? New oppressed or suffering groups may emerge,
such as Mexican-Americans or Haitians.
As discussed in the Introduction, the principal Richmond decision and
all the Metro opinions overtly create a double standard for the states and
for Congress, the precondition for any dilution. This Article's extension
of the double standard in the affirmative action area should not be con-
strued as approval of the actual Richmond decision. I believe O'Connor
misapplied the double standard.22° Because Congress has created affir-
mative action programs for federal contracts and because Congress has
not exercised its section 5 powers to ban similar state plans, the Court
should not have intervened, particularly to the disadvantage of Southern
blacks, the primary historical beneficiaries of the fourteenth amendment.
O'Connor's position in Metro is even more disturbing; she put virtually
the same constraints on Congress as she did on the States.221
All the section 5 decisions involved Congressional remedies which pro-
vided more relief than did existing judicial definitions of equal protection.
Thus the Court never has directly decided a case where Congress nar-
rowed pre-existing judicial equal protection law. However, Justice Bren-
under § 5 'to enforce by appropriate legislation' the equal protection guarantee
of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 476.
In his concurrence, Justice Powell discussed section 5's limits: "But the United
States may not employ unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon
unconstitutional considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipientis not legally entitled." Id. at 515 n. 13 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell's invocation
of the unconstitutional condition theory does not defeat this article's suggestion.Congress may be able to impose conditions that states cannot. If so, then thereis no violation of equal protection or of the equal protection component of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued in his dissent that Con-
gress had exceeded its powers: "For in the exercise of its powers, Congress must
obey the Constitution just as the legislatures of all the States must obey the
Constitution in the exercise of their powers. If a law is unconstitutional, it notless unconstitutional just because it is a product of Congress of the United States".
Id. at 526-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He elaborated on this point in a footnote:
"[The enforcement clauses of the thirteenth and fourteenth Amendments do not
grant] to Congress the [power] to enact legislation that itself violated the equalprotection component of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 528 n.7.
When one considers the procedural sloppiness that generated this particularprogram, a sloppiness that Justice Stevens found to be fatal, Fullilove suggests
that the Court already applies a double standard of equal protection. Would theCourt be as deferential to a state affirmative action plan if the state had acted
as summarily as Congress had, particularly if the beneficiaries were not black?
220 Under this Article's approach, Congress may have the power to prohibit all
affirmative action progress. Indeed, four Justices so construed Title VI in Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1977). On the other hand, the Court should engage in at leastintermediate scrutiny of any act that disadvantages blacks under the fourteenth
amendment. As I noted in my Introduction, this article is not primarily about
affirmative action. The precise application of this doctrine would need to be care-
fully issued out in light of the confusing caselaw. For example, how should the
court review a congressional statute extending affirmative action to women but
not to blacks? I prefer to emphasize the youth poverty issue, not the affirmative
action problem.
221 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3030 (O'Connor, J. dis-
senting).
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nan wrote a footnote in Katzenbach explicitly proscribing any such
Congressional efforts to reduce judicial powers:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, [citation omitted]
§ 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the
other direction and to enact 'statutes so as in effect to dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.' We
emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the
States to establish racially segregated systems of education
would not be - as required by § 5 - a measure 'to enforce'
the Equal Protection since that clause of its own force prohibits
such state laws.
222
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed Katzenbach in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan.223 After first holding that Congress' Title IX did not
permit any sexual discrimination at the college level, O'Connor observed:
"Although we give deference to congressional decisions and classifica-
tions, neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
224
Justice Powell, on the other hand, endorsed the theory that section 5
creates two standards, generating more power for Congress than for the
States. In Fullilove, Powell implied in his concurrence that Congress may
have exceptional powers in implementing affirmative action programs:
"The degree of specificity required in the findings of discrimination and
the breadth of discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the
nature and authority of a governmental body.
'225 Powell's position, of
course, became law in Richmond and Metro.
Justice Brennan's analysis of section 5 in Katzenbach and Justice
O'Connor's reaffirmation of the nondilution doctrine in Hogan do not
present insurmountable hurdles to the acceptance of this Article's prop-
222 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall elaborated on
this argument in their dissent from that part of the decision in Oregon v. Mitchell
which held that Congress could not require the States to give eighteen year-olds
the right to vote in state elections. According to the dissenting justices, equal
protection identically binds Congress and the States:
a decision of this Court striking down a state statute expresses, among other
things, our conclusion that the legislative findings upon which the statute
is based are so far wrong as to be unreasonable. Unless Congress were to
unearth new evidence in its investigation, its identical findings on the
identical issue would be no more reasonable than those of the state legis-
lature.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 249 n. 31 (Brennan, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (emphasis added). This dissenting position is incompatible with the ar-
ticle's proposal, which does not require Congress to make new factual findings.
223 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
224 Id. at 732.
222 448 U.S. at 515 n. 14 (Powell, J., concurring).
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osition. In large part, those opinions restate the MarburylShapiro thesis
that Congress cannot violate equal protection. Thus the immediate ques-
tion remains begged. If the Court held that Congress could dilute certain
equal protection holdings because of section 5, without violating equal
protection, then Congress would not violate equal protection in such sit-
uations.
There are three additional reasons to discount all prior judicial dis-
cussions about section 5. First, all of the analysis is dicta because the
Court has never held that Congress has improperly diluted an existing
equal protection guarantee. The Court has upheld expanded Congres-
sional power, construed Congressional actions to avoid constitutional con-
flict, or held, in Oregon, that Congress exceeded its supplemental powers.
Second, the Justices discussed dilution without considering the possibility
that there might be the proposed fourth level of scrutiny, an "intensified
scrutiny" that could be reversed by Congress. We cannot be sure that any
of the Justices would reject this new conception of dilution until they
considered it. Perhaps a majority of them would welcome a dialogue with
Congress about some of the more difficult determinations of "reasona-
bleness." Finally, it bears repeating that this new doctrine would not
dilute any existing fourteenth amendment rights nor any additional four-
teenth amendment rights that the Court seeks to keep immune from
Congressional review. This doctrine would only expand judicial and
Congressional review over a set of issues which would presently be re-
solved in favor of the States.
Justice Brennan's concurrence/dissent in Mitchell presents a more se-
rious obstacle, because Brennan discussed how the underlying substance
of equal protection analysis affects the scope of section 5. On one level,
his argument endorsed a limited amount of dilution; he concluded that
a prior Supreme Court decision which found a state law unconstitutional
could be reversed by Congress if Congress came up with a new set of facts
that made the governmental action "reasonable." This Article's proposal,
however, envisions both a greater and a lesser scope for Congressional
action. Congress would be able to dilute certain equal protection decisions
even if it had not found any new data to support the previously repudiated
state law. "New facts" would not be the necessary for limited dilution.
The underlying problem is easy to state and difficult to resolve. How
is the Court to define "reasonableness?"'226 That inquiry leads the Court
into the bewildering world of impermissible purposes, the fit between
ends and means, alternatives, stigmas, prejudices and stereotypes. As the
Court moves from questions of formal equality to more egalitarian issues,
the state's interests tend to become more "reasonable." The state can
always respond to any redistribution of wealth claim by stating that it
chose not to aid the poor in a given way because (1) it had insufficient
226 A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
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resources;227 (2) the poor would be worse off in the long run; and/or (3)
the benefits are not essential. The proposed doctrine would acknowledge
the difficulty of the inquiry by allowing both the Court and Congress
more room to participate in these more difficult decisions.
The problems with existing dilution doctrine can also be demonstrated
by returning to this Article's initial premise. One can imagine a Court
that would find "unreasonable" societal indifference to or exploitation of
continuous suffering by an innocent group. But that political assessment
would be difficult to make and difficult to enforce over time. If the Court
is to be a caretaker for losing groups, whose membership may change
(the elderly were far poorer fifteen years ago), it should not perform that
role alone. Characterizing many disturbing, unequal distributions of
wealth and power as totally "unreasonable" not only begs the question
of "reasonableness," but also oversimplifies that difficult issue.
The ambiguity of "reasonableness" also appears in existing substantive
equal protection doctrine, thereby providing another justification for the
proposed doctrine. Justice Stevens' conclusion in Kadrmas that the state
had no "rational" reason to charge indigents to use the schoolbus obscures
as much as it reveals. Justice Marshall's sliding scale, which balances
the individual's interests against the state's interests, is not much more
helpful than Stevens' "rationality" test. Both signify that the final judicial
result will neither be easily determined nor clearly definable. Whenever
the Court tries to protect certain groups, such as the mentally retarded,
the mentally ill or the aged, the state can assert interests and reasons
which are not as vicious or as historically tainted as race or sex based
laws. For instance, it is not self-evidently "unreasonable" for the State
to conclude that at some age most people become less dynamic workers,
and that keeping all workers employed until they die or quit blocks
opportunities for younger workers. At some point the state may try to
draw a bright line barring people above a certain age from participating
in certain occupations. How is Marshall to balance those asserted inter-
ests? He may blunder in applying his test in age discrimination cases -
requiring states to employ bus drivers who are too old, for instance. The
possibility of judicial error or insensitivity is great in such areas. La-
belling the state action as "unreasonable" only begs the question of the
extent of unreasonableness in the statute. Because there are degrees of
unreasonableness, the Court should allow Congress to participate in this
determination, particularly when the Court is unsure of its judgment.
After all, the state obviously had "reasons" for its actions. The issue is
whether or not it had unconstitutional reasons. If the liberal members of
the Court maintain that judicial intervention is justified only when a
state action is totally unreasonable, virtually beyond redemption, they
227 "[Olur review of distinctions that Congress draws in order to make alloca-
tions from a finite pool of resources must be deferential, for the discretion about
how best to spend money to improve the general welfare is lodged in Congress
rather than the courts." Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1193
(1988) (citing Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986)).
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are falling into an ossifying trap similar to the problem caused when the
Court had to choose between strict scrutiny and rational purpose review.
The standard of unconstitutionality may be so high that effective judicial
review of contemporary problems is impossible, or else the standard be-
comes a conclusion that obfuscates the complexities of the issue.
To put the problem another way, the Court has a duty to root out
unconstitutional prejudices. But some prejudices are more reasonable
than others. In his classic work on prejudice, Gordon Allport concluded:
"The distinction between a well-founded generalization and an erroneous
generalization is very hard to draw .... ,,228 Nobody can properly sort out
all impermissible prejudices or determine exactly which prejudices are
unconstitutional and which are not. Such delicate judgments should not
be left exclusively in the Court's hands. For example, Justice Marshall
based his dissent in Lyng v. International Union, UAW on the ground that
the federal government acts "irrationally" whenever it discriminates
against a politically unpopular group. In Lyng the unpopular group was
striking union members who would be receiving food stamps. But vir-
tually all losers in a legislative battle are to some degree, by definition,
politically unpopular. It may be mean-spirited and counterproductive to
pass laws that aid management against labor, but it is not necessarily
"irrational." Otherwise, any change in labor law could be characterized
as the triumph of the majority, who passed the law, over a politically
unpopular group, be it labor or management. Justice Marshall may really
be arguing that Congress never should use food as a political weapon. I
endorse such a substantive conception of justice, but have trouble con-
cluding that those who believe otherwise are totally irrational.
C. Doctrinal Analogues Outside Section Five
In several areas, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Constitution to permit Congress to authorize the states to create laws
that the Court initially considered unconstitutional: commerce regulation
(the dormant commerce clause),229 interstate compacts,230 import and ex-
228 G. W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 19 (1954). Allport then observes
that people are least able to see their own prejudices. Id. at 20. Some "prejudices"
are desirable, even essential to a well-formed society: "Indolence, negligence, want
of order and method, obstinacy, fickleness, rashness, credulity; these qualities
were never esteemed by anyone indifferent to character; much less extolled as
accomplishments or virtues. The prejudice, resulting from them, immediately
strikes our eye, and gives us the sentiment of pain and disapprobation." D. HuME,
supra note 196, at 68.
1 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), in which the Court upheld a state
scheme that violated the commerce clause because the Court believed Congresshad authorized such a plan. The Court has stated in dictum that Congress has
the power to "permit the states to regulate commerce in a manner that would
not otherwise be permissible .... Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945).
11 See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452(1978); Northeast Bancorp. Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal ReserveSystem, 472 U.S. 159 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
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port duties and taxation of federal instrumentalities. 231 These analogies
support the related doctrines of limited dilution and a double standard,
even though they are distinguishable. In the examples, the Court held
that Congress has plenary power over those areas, which necessitated
giving Congress the power to alter Supreme Court decisions. The four-
teenth amendment falls primarily under the judicial sphere; Congres-
sional power within section 5 is not plenary, but supplementary and/or
complementary. Yet Congress would not gain an upper hand in this vital
area of individual rights. Under the proposed equal protection test, the
Supreme Court has the final authority to determine which areas within
equal protection are reviewable or unreviewable by Congress.
Those four fields differ substantively from equal protection claims. Pro-
fessor Tribe observed that none of the Congressional powers which can
be invoked to override Supreme Court adjudications involve "private
rights against government action (such as the commands of the fourteenth
amendment)."23 2 Tribe's statement seems slightly excessive; the ability
to engage in commerce in any state has elements of a "private right,"
similar to the "fundamental right" out of staters have to practice law on
terms of substantial equality with instaters, as protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section two. 23  But even if one accepts
Tribe's distinction, it does not reach the question we are considering:
what ought to be the commands of the fourteenth amendment? Must the
dictates of the fourteenth amendment always fall equally on the states
and on Congress, even though Congress arguably has better fact-finding
abilities, is less likely to be seized by a narrow and vicious factions,
23 4
and better reflects the majority's will?
Tribe's reply to those rhetorical questions might be that the dormant
commerce clause cases exemplify judicial protection of background rules,
"negative judicial inferences from a constitutional grant of power to Con-
gress. ' 23 5 In other words, the court is acting as Congress' agent. The
fourteenth amendment is an area of judicial supremacy. But a similar
argument could be made to explain the proposed change in section 5
doctrine - in certain difficult equal protection cases, the court would be
acting as a partner-agent, not as a boss. The text has given Congress
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment. The question is the scope of
that power.
For better or worse, Tribe's distinction between private rights cases
and the "background rules" decisions does not perfectly reflect existing
-1 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supra note 55, at 521. Congress
also has limited power to change the law of "standing." See, G. GUNTHER, CON-
sTrUTIONAL LAW 1573 (11th ed. 1985).
232 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985).
- One of Madison's main arguments in The Federalist Papers was that a large
representative government was less vulnerable to faction than a small one, see
G. WILLS, EXPLADUNG AMERICA, 193-200, 218-230 (1981).
225 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55, 403-04.
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doctrine. The Court has not always equally applied the fourteenth amend-
ment to state and national governments. In addition to Richmond and
Metro, the main examples are in criminal procedure. Federal defendants
have a Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment,2 6 but state
defendants have no similar right under the fourteenth amendment. Both
state and federal criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a
jury, but they do not have identical constitutional rights to either the
size of the jury or to jury unanimity for convictions.2 37
The Court has edged toward a double standard in several other areas.
Two student Notes have concluded that the Court's bewildering resolution
of aliens' constitutional claims can only be explained on the ground that
Congress has more power than the States to regulate aliens, based upon
the explicit Constitutional authorization that Congress can regulate im-
migration.238 In similar free speech cases, the Court deferred to a congres-
sional ban of secondary boycotts, which prevented a union from protesting
the Russian invasion of Afghanistan,239 but rejected a state court's de-
termination that an NAACP boycott of white merchants during the civil
rights movement caused recoverable damages.240 Finally, in Plyler v. Doe,
the Court implied that it might have ruled differently if Congress had
created a general policy proscribing all benefits to undocumented aliens
to deter illegal immigration.241
D. Nonjudicial Proposals to Enhance Congressional Powers
Although this proposed change in section 5 doctrine is novel, it is far
from revolutionary. Several lawyers have proposed interpretations of sec-
tion 5 which would enhance Congressional power to construe the four-
teenth amendment. Attorney Stephen Galebach maintained that
Congress has the power to overrule Roe v. Wade, the abortion case, under
section 5. Galebach argued that because Congress can better determine
when life begins due to its superior fact-finding abilities, Congress could
216 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356 (1972).
21 Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31
STAN L. REV. 1069 (1979) and Note, State Burdens of Resident Aliens: A New
Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L. J. 940 (1980). See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976). Several scholars have proposed that these cases are actually
based on the supremacy clause. See, e.g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1023 (1979); Choper, Dis-
crimination Against Aliens, in J. Choper, Y. Kamisar and L. Tribe, The SupremeCourt Trends And Developments (1983); Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 255.
n9 International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International, Inc., 456
U.S. 212 (1982).7A0 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
241 457 U.S. at 224-26.
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conclude that life and personhood began at conception. That factual find-
ing would strip Roe of one of its assumptions: nobody knows when life
begins. 242 While President, Richard Nixon proposed congressional legis-
lation banning forced busing of school students in segregated school dis-
tricts. Nixon argued that Congress had power under section 5 to limit
judicial power because of the "fundamental difference" between a "rem-
edy" such as busing and the "right" not to be racially discriminated
against.2
43
Professors Ely and Tribe attacked Galebach's maneuvers as an uncon-
stitutional subterfuge which would gut constitutional rights.244 Suddenly
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment would be determined by an
electoral majority. Professor Bork criticized the Nixon proposal from the
opposite perspective; the Supreme Court erred in Katzenbach in holding
that Congress has any supplemental powers under section 5, much less
any power to reverse or alter Supreme Court decisions.245 Professor Gor-
don summed up the academic disapproval of diminishing constitutional
rights by forming a Congressional majority under section 5, rather than
by proceeding through the supermajoritarian amendment process: "Con-
gress has power to overturn empirical findings of the Court; but it can
do so only as long as it does not infringe on the normative component of
the judicial decision. '246 One cannot be sure how these academics would
react if the dilution expanded equal protection and due process instead
of contracting those clauses. Furthermore, such fundamental decisions
as Brown and Roe would not be affected by this doctrine. They involve
such fundamental individual rights that governmental abrogation by
either the states or Congress is impermissible.
247
Professor Cohen has argued that Congress should have the power to
alter any of the Court's "federalism" decisions, but not any of the Court's
"liberty" decisions. 248 For example, Congress could change any judicial
interpretations of the Tenth amendment, but none of the Fourteenth
amendment. Cohen explained that the "political safeguards of federal-
242 Galebach, A Human Life Statute, THE HUM. LIFE R. 5 (1981) (reprinted in
127 Cong. Rec. 288 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1981)).
24 Quoted in G. GUNTHER, Constitutional Law 719 n.2 (11th ed. 1985).
24 Ely and Tribe, Let There Be Life, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1981, cited in G.
GUNTHER, supra note 231, at 965 n. 14.
25 R. BORK, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PRoPosALs (1972).
2 Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five
of the 14th Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 NW U.
L. REv. 656, 691 (1977).
, See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
24 Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 614 (1975). See also Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN.
L. REv. 387 (1983). Professor Choper made a similar distinction when he proposed
that the Supreme Court be far more judicially active in reviewing "rights" cases
than structural issues. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980).
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ism," which check Congressional overreaching in federalism cases, are
irrelevant in individual rights issues. The states can better protect them-
selves in the national political arena than can individuals. Cohen's con-
clusion resembles Gordon's: "congressional judgment rejecting a judicial
interpretation of the due process or equal protection clauses-an inter-
pretation that gave the individual procedural or substantive protection
from state and federal government alike -is entitled to no more deference
than the identical decision of the state legislator." 249 Cohen's proposal
may give too much power to Congress - the constitutional structure is
one of our greatest protections against tyranny. There is no reason to
completely preclude the Court from that area of constitutional interpre-
tation. 25
0
Professor Burt argued that Congress has significant power under sec-
tion 5 to expand equal protection "around the edges" of existing doctrine:
"The Court could approve Congressional action that reshaped Court doc-
trine to make it responsive to conflicting interests in a manner that the
Court itself might not comfortably be able to reach. '251 Burt turned the
concerns over judicial competence- the inability to draw principled
lines- into an argument justifying enhanced Congressional power. He
specifically suggested that Congress might have the power to "partially
reverse" Miranda v. Arizona's requirement that police read suspects a
specific list of rights.25 2
The scholars' fear of dilution is understandable. But this Article's prop-
osition will not dilute existing dilution doctrine, which permanently pro-
tects existing equal protection rights. The Court would only tolerate
dilution of those equal protection rights which plaintiffs would otherwise
not receive under existing law. The hostility to any dilution helps create
the constitutional straightjacket that encumbers judicial protection of
many individuals and groups, such as poor children. The Court knows
that any constitutional remedy 253 it creates is virtually permanent.254
Because all decisions against the states apply to Congress, the prudential
2
49 Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 614 (1975).
o See generally Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341.(1985).
211 Bur, Miranda and Title II: A Morgantic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81,
121 (1969).
22 Id. at 123. Professor Burt never really integrated this "partial reversal"
concept with the Morgan anti-dilution doctrine, which Burt characterized as
"seemingly ... an afterthought." Id. at 114.
m The Court of course can reverse itself. Amendments are fortunately infre-
quent.
2"Constitutional remedies are necessary to vindicate constitutional rights,
but the Constitution rarely mandates a specific remedy: "With rare exceptions,
the Court has not read the Constitution to require particular remedies for vio-
lations of its express prohibitions; the choice of remedies is peculiarly a matter of
policy, which requires the exercise of legislative judgment or equitable discretion."
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 55 (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted).
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forces of federalism and of deference to a co-equal branch combine to
encourage judicial restraint. These legitimate constraints tempt the Court
to limit its inquiry to issues of formal equality and to periodic, ad hoc
solicitude for particularly sympathetic groups, such as the mentally re-
tarded or children of illegal aliens.
Responding to charges that the Court acts either incompetently or
illegitimately in its resolution of many contemporary constitutional is-
sues, several liberal scholars have proposed that Congress become a more
equal participant in the constitutional discourse. Paul Brest argued:
Most citizens, politicians, and scholars seem to agree with or
acquiesce to the Supreme Court's claim to be the ultimate in-
terpreter of the Constitution ... The net effect is to system-
atically exclude citizens and their representatives from some
of the most fundamental decisions of the polity. This is com-
pletely at odds with the classical conception of citizenship. 2m
Brest has continued to struggle with determining the proper scope of
Congress' role in constitutional interpretation. His most recent diagnosis
is more pessimistic: "Congress' traditions and practices of considering
constitutional questions are so weak and untrustworthy that it is not
ready to enter into a dialogue. It needs a tutorial first."
256 Perhaps allow-
ing Congress to interpret the equal protection clause in a few situations
where the Court would not otherwise act might be a good place to begin
that tutorial.
Specific non-section 5 proposals to alter the relationship between the
Court and Congress have ranged from the relatively humble to the dan-
gerously sweeping. Professor Tribe suggested a change in constitutional
doctrine that would undermine his general proposition that the Congress
cannot authorize the diminution of private rights. He proposed that the
Court's determination of what process is due under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment should no longer be limited to Justice
Holmes' "all or nothing" approach set forth in Bi-Metallic, Inv. Co. v State
Board of Equalization.257 Holmes interpreted the due process clause to
require meaningful procedures for individual adjudications, but not to
provide any participation in decisions affecting large numbers of people.
Tribe recommended that the Court should make a more nuanced due
process analysis when the plaintiffs are members of a small group, caught
in the doctrinally grey area between being individually affected and being
the subject of general rules and policies. According to Tribe, the Supreme
255 Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL, L. REV. 661, 670 (1985). DeTocqueville put
the point more generally: "But I maintain that in the most powerful land perhaps
the only means that we still possess of interesting men in the welfare of their
country is to make them partakers in the government." A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (1945).
256 Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57, 103 (1986).
7 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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Court should "adjust the mix of direct and representative participation
to which the individual is entitled." 8 Because such balancing is obviously
difficult, Tribe suggested that the Court allow a "legislative remand" that
closely resembles this Article's proposal:
Instead, the decisions might frame a constitutional common
law, leaving legislatures with the power to design other meth-
ods of protecting the individual's participatory interests. Thus,
such a jurisprudence could effect a 'remand to the legislature',
prodding it to discover and develop new systems of 'due process'
more compatible with the needs of the administrative state.25 9
Tribe neither grounded his plan in text, nor did he explain why his
technique should be limited to innovative procedural due process reme-
dies,260 which clearly are individual rights. This Article differs by basing
its version of the "constitutional remand" in the text of section 5, and by
widening the scope of the idea to cover the entire fourteenth amendment,
substantive as well as procedural. Yet this Article's approach resembles
Tribe's position in that it does not determine the full contours of the
proposed doctrine. The caselaw would be a form of evolutionary consti-
tutional common law,261 hopefully leading to additional constitutional
rights for the aged, the infirm, the mentally ill and the poor (particularly
poor children). It might also have applicability to new issues, such as
AIDS. Thus it would retain the classic strengths of common law- evolving
over time, uncramped by rigid theory, reviewable by the legislative
branch.
Tribe's 'Judicial remand" already exists in American Constitutional
law and theory. In the course of explaining why the remand would be a
major tool of "structural justice," Tribe presented its pedigree:
58 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 766. Tribe has also sug-
gested that certain individual rights issues might best be resolved under a com-
mon law model: "A common law basis for determining rights for refusing
treatment also has the advantage of leaving the issue open for the legislature to
establish different standards and procedures for dealing with these difficult prob-
lems." Id. at 1366 n. 15.
2
59 Id. at 767.
21 A student note argues that Congress has broad powers to reinterpret the
three doctrinal prongs of the due process clause: procedural due process, sub-
stantive due process, and the incorporation doctrine. Note, Congressional Power
to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1265 (1980). Thus Congress
might have the power to legalize homosexuality as a constitutionally protected
privacy interest. Of course, under my theory, the Court could initially protect
homosexuals, but leave the final decision to Congress.
261 See, e.g. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term- Foreward: Consti-
tutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975). See also G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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Both the Panama Refining approach and that of Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong and Bakke put pressure on legislatures and/or
agencies to reconsider the invalidated provision from a fresh
perspective, and both approaches leave open the possibility that
the court may uphold a somewhat revised provision if such
reconsideration leads to its enactment either in an altered form,
or in the same form but by a different body. Thus both ap-
proaches bear some similarity to the notion of "remand to the
legislature" often advocated by constitutional and common-law
commentators. 62
In short, both judicial and academic precedents exist that resemble this
Article's proposal.
Professor Perry tried to resolve the tension between judicial review by
nine elected judges and the presumptive validity of legislation in a dem-
ocratic society by proposing that Congress can use its Article I powers
which allow it to establish the jurisdiction of lower federal courts to trump
Supreme Court constitutional opinions.Y Perry's plan shifts too much
power to Congress, which could frustrate all constitutional rights by
clever limitations to jurisdiction. One does not want to give Congress any
power to threaten such essential opinions as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.26 4 Certain issues are properly beyond the legislative domain, unless
the legislatures seek to amend the Constitution itself.
Allowing Congress to dilute some of the Court's equal protection de-
cisions incorporates many of the above themes. It is a concrete way to
increase the constitutional dialogue between Congress, the Court and the
citizenry. Dialogue, after all, implies a discussion between relatively
equal parties. Congress and the Court are not engaging in a serious
dialogue if either can always do whatever it wishes. Expanding section
5 power grants more power to the Court and Congress (at the expense of
the States), forcing them both to reconsider the contours of equal protec-
262 L. TRIBE, CONsTrrIUONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 1680 (footnotes omitted).
26 M. PERRY, THE CONsTrruTION, THE CouRTs, AND HuMAN RIGHTS 128 (1982).
Professors Gunther and McCloskey have both argued that the Court should some-
times give rational purpose scrutiny some "bite." See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1982); Mc-
Closkey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34. The Court should not accept post hoc justifications
for a law but should look at the articulated purposes. Gunther also proposed that
the Court should empirically assess the fit between the ends and the means
"largely in terms of information presented by the defenders of the law rather
than hypothesizing data of its own." Their proposals are troubling because they
provide the Court with no principled way to decide when to invoke that scrutiny.
The economic substantive due process doctrine of Lochner could suddenly reap-
pear. Major doctrinal shifts can occur through seemingly minor realterations of
burdens of proof. The section 5 proposal would allow intervention in some of these
cases - such as U.S. Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) - but would
avoid the permanent constitutionalization of those interventions.
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion. It provides impoverished individuals with direct access to the federal
system instead of forcing them to negotiate through Congress. The Court
can be far more creative, knowing that it can be checked by the legis-
lature. That check also becomes more acceptable as the Court ventures
away from the relatively straightforward, noncontroversial ideal of for-
mal equality into the more empirical, debatable arenas of equal oppor-
tunity, egalitarianism and the elimination of unreasonableness. In a
sense, the Court would be encouraging Congress to use its section 5 powers
to advance equality beyond previously existing judicial interpretations
of the fourteenth amendment by showing Congress problems of inequality
that need to be addressed. For example, Congress should be forced to
decide if states can charge fees to poor children for taking a school bus.
Such egregious behavior should not be legitimated as a completely ac-
ceptable form of constitutional behavior.
Focusing on poverty and poor young people clarifies what factors might
be relevant in expanding the fourteenth amendment beyond the relatively
noncontroversial area of procedural due process. The prior exploration of
poor childrens' equal protection rights (and non-rights) demonstrates how
the Court could develop a major body of substantive constitutional com-
mon law that could partially implement some of the constitutional norms
which currently remain unenforced or underenforced. 265 The Court could
remind the country of its constitutional obligations to pursue substantive
equality, forcing the majority to consider aspirational values that remain
unfulfilled. Such a combination of moral and legal pressure would un-
dercut the complacency that results from existing constitutional doctrine;
defendants tend to believe that their actions are right because they are
constitutional. Instead, the Court would tell the elected branches their
actions violate constitutional norms, but that they have the ultimate
power to live under that cloud or to remove that stigma.
IX. JURISPRUDENTIAL RESERVATIONS
A. Conservative Criticisms
The initial conservative response to this idea and its application to poor
children would probably resemble the critique of Professor Michelman's
proposal to finance "just wants. 2 6 6 Conservatives would argue that ex-
265 Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Professor Sager argued that Congress has
a duty to enforce those constitutional norms that the Court does not enforce
because of institutional limitations. Id. at 1264. This article's proposal would
enhance that prospect because the Court, not as inhibited by concerns over its
competence, could nudge the Congress in the right direction. Poor children should
have constitutional support. This proposal might backfire if Congress repeatedly
repudiated the judicial vision. But such a confrontation, which Congress would
win over the short run, would at least bring the issue to the public's attention.
2" See supra notes 139-45.
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pansion of section 5 could not be justified by the text or history of the
Constitution.21 7 Judicially mandated aid for poor children would be an
illegitimate exercise ofjudicial power, reminiscent of Lochner. Increasing
aid to the poor would also constitute bad policy. American society has
already been corrupted by an excessive egalitarianism that saps the will
to succeed, and by an overly intrusive judiciary which undermines the
populace's will and capacity to rule themselves.
Note that several of the classic arguments favoring judicial restraint
have less than their usual weight. The proposed doctrine has acknowl-
edged and incorporated some of the reservations about judicial interven-
tion. Aggressive judicial review is far more "legitimate" if it can be
trumped by the national elected branches. The electorate, through their
Congressional representatives, retains the "last word" concerning these
contentious egalitarian issues. Concerns about judicial competence in
formulating rights, discovering violations, establishing standards and
formulating remedies are reduced because Congress can review the
Court's efforts. Most contemporary problems of equality, such as equal
opportunity, have an empirical component; no abstract, formalistic test
exists to determine when opportunity has become equal (or even tolerably
unequal). The Court can lead and experiment, knowing Congress may
correct its initial assessments.
Many contemporary conservatives and some liberals may also complain
about the doctrine's effects on federalism. Both by creating a double stand-
ard that places a greater burden on the States than on Congress and by
allowing greater judicial intervention, backed up by subsequent Congres-
sional intervention, the redefinition of section 5 could lead to an exces-
sively powerful national government. Yet the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment in general, and section 5 in particular, is to allow the Court
and Congress to have more power over the states. State and local gov-
ernments are more vulnerable to factions which can brutalize losers in
the political arena. Congress cannot be expected to monitor and prevent
all new forms of tyranny; individuals should be able to immediately turn
to the Courts for relief from state statutes that have unconstitutional
traits. Furthermore, the states still retain the "political safeguards of
federalism."2 They can lobby Congress to overturn any judicial opinions
that they believe were incorrectly decided under this doctrine.
267 See Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?
77 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1047 (1977). For a discussion of the history of section 5,
see Burt, Miranda and Title II, supra note 249, at 84-101.
w Professor Wechsler coined the phrase "political safeguards of federalism" to
help explain the theory that the states must defend themselves against federal
oppression through the political process instead of through the judiciary. See. e.g.,
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
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B. Liberal Criticisms
Like the conservatives, many liberals may have both theoretical and
practical objections to the expansion of section 5 powers. Allowing Con-
gress to reverse the Court dilutes Dworkin's conception of "rights," which
are individual trumps over collective action. 269 The precedents this Article
has used-setting a double standard for jury procedures, for example-
only demonstrate that those decisions were wrong, not that they should
become a model for a new fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. Such a
critique is not so troubling if one is not a "pure" rights theorist, believing
that most, if not all, rights sometimes must be modified. Indeed, any effort
to redistribute wealth conflicts with the "right" of the more wealthy to
be allowed to enjoy their property as they see fit. According to the phi-
losopher Thomas Nagel, redistribution does not easily fit into rights rhet-
oric, which is based upon consent.2 70
The proposal is risky even if one does not subscribe to a pure rights
theory. Dilutable individual rights may corrode undilutable individual
rights. The Court, particularly the present Court, might use this new
discretion to undermine existing law without expanding equal protection.
Such progressive cases as Plyler and Cleburne might be recharacterized
as dilutable section 5 cases. The mentally retarded, who have just started
to receive constitutional protection in Cleburne, would suddenly find
themselves at the mercy of Congress whenever they persuaded the Court
to extend Cleburne. Any time the Court felt enough sympathy for a new
set of plaintiffs, they would only provide this vulnerable protection. New
non-dilutable equal protection rights would be rarities. In short, this
buck-passing technique would make decisions too easy for the Court,
leaving individuals insufficiently protected even when they prevail. Per-
haps most importantly, liberals should be wary of making any doctrinal
arguments that broadly enhance the Court's power, given the Court's
current personnel.
Furthermore, one cannot easily predict the doctrine's impact; how will
it affect due process privacy rights, the Bill of Rights, state action, and
other difficult issues that arise under the fourteenth amendment? The
proposed sharing of constitutional power may also dissipate responsibil-
ity. Everyone now knows who is primarily responsible for helping or not
helping the poor: the Executive, Congress and the states. If the Court
269 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Even Dworkin hedges; fun-
damental rights may be trumped by the government "when necessary to protect
rights of others, or to prevent a catastrophe." Id. at 191.
Some tension between rights theories and redistribution proposals may be in-
evitable: "[Rights] give every person a limited veto over how others may treathim ... This kind of unanimity condition is possible only for rights that limit
what one person may do to another. There cannot in this sense be rights to have
certain things-a right to medical care, or to a decent standard of living, or even
a right to life." T. NAGEL, MORTAL QUEsTIONs, supra note 168, at 114.2 70
1d.
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and Congress shared that obligation, based upon a division of powers
which would partially be a function of inevitably subtle, even arbitrary
doctrinal distinctions, the potentially confused public may either feel
either the problem is being handled properly or that their representatives
are no longer accountable for the issue.
Such arguments can be raised against any effort to enhance judicial
discretion. But as Chief Justice Storey noted years ago: "It is always a
doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from
the possibility of its abuse.12 71 Perhaps we liberals should withdraw from
making any sweeping propositions while the Court grows increasingly
conservative, and wait until a more sympathetic group of Justices as-
sumes power. That wait, however, may be a long one. Liberals should
follow the example of the conservative academy during the Warren Court
era; conservative scholars developed both abstract theories and specific
counter-proposals to justify their criticisms of that Court. In a sense, the
liberal academic wing may be reduced to a shadow Court for the fore-
seeable future. It may lose some of its voice if it only engages in theory,
case by case counterattacks, or history. The liberal bloc must offer coun-
terdoctrine that responds to the changing values of our society and of the
Court.
The fear of dilution of existing law may be excessive. Cases such as
Cleburne or Boddie should not be threatened because they were decided
on the assumption that the challenged action was so inappropriate, so
irrational, that neither Congress nor the States could engage in such
activity. The Court would be mangling this proposal if it first diluted
existing rights and then failed to provide relief to plaintiffs who desper-
ately need the novel relief.
An additional liberal critique is that the change in law would make
little difference; the meager benefits would be offset by the potential costs.
Even if litigants could persuade the Court to use the doctrine aggressively,
Congress would reverse any significant decisions. Thus the doctrine would
not come close to addressing the problems of poverty that were raised in
the earlier part of this Article. For example, Congress established the
underlying legal structure that supported the state law denying addi-
tional relief to large families in Dandridge v. Williams. The two recent
food stamp cases Lyng v. Castillo272 and Lyng v. Industrial Union, UAW,
interpreted federal laws which were unsympathetic to the poor. After
Roe, Congress provided less funding for abortions than many states. The
first place Congress probably would look to reduce government deficits
would be any judicial section five cases that gave Congress the final
word.273
271 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816). See also
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 362 (1985).
272 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
273 108 S.Ct. 1184 (1988).
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There is cause for such pessimism about our elected representatives.
Yet the Constitution is one of the clearest manifestations of the belief
that this is a country of hope, and of the faith, perhaps naive, in the
ultimate fairness of a mixed government that is primarily democratic.
Congress may hesitate before reversing many of these decisions, partic-
ularly those that will not cost much money. It is hard to imagine a Con-
gress that would charge poor children to take school buses2 74 or would
create unique political hurdles for the poor. Perhaps the electorate will
not re-elect a Congress that consistently repudiates the more progressive
decisions of the Court.
The technique is also somewhat unsatisfactory because it does not offer
permanent, substantive protection to the poor. Although it does have a
substantive component, it resembles structural and procedural solutions
because all of its substantive results can be eliminated by Congress. It
will probably not make a serious dent on the profound problems facing
our country. Yet even if the idea does not result in significant transfers
of wealth, it might help prevent such gratuitously cruel policies as charg-
ing poor children to use public school buses. In addition, those seeking
constitutionalization of a guaranteed annual income face even more se-
rious problems of initially getting the Court to accept their interpretation,
and of implementing that interpretation. For example, how is the Court
to determine how much welfare a poor worker must receive, given per-
petual changes in such factors as tax rates,2 75 minimum wage scale and
availability of work? How is the Court to determine the appropriate mix
of cash and non-cash benefits? Should welfare benefits be conditioned
upon thec parent's willingness to accept work, or at least to enroll children
in an early learning center?276 Perhaps this article's compromise is an
appropriate way for the Court to explore these problems without making
serious, irreversible blunders.
C. Institutional Criticisms
The approach can also be criticized for being unwieldy. The Court would
have to write two difficult opinions instead of one. It would first decide
if equal protection has been violated, and then determine if its decision
2 Congress has passed a law that requires the states to provide free schoolingto handicapped children if the states wish to receive federal assistance, Education
of the Handicapped Act, § 601, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq. For a discussion of that
act, see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
11 The federal tax rates perpetually shift, particularly when one includes social
security. In the past few years, the tax burden has increased for the poor. A family
of four at the poverty line was paying "more than 16 percent of its income indirect taxes, almost double the percentage paid in 1965." Danzinger and Weinberg,Introduction 10, in FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 138.11 These suggestions were made by the Chicago Tribune. CHICAGO TRiBUNE,
MILLSTONE, supra note 36, at 298. Voters have been more willing to provide
services than discretionary income. FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 138, at 24.
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is final or is a section five decision. Two bodies of doctrine would have to
be developed, two sliding scales, both relying on malleable standards.
Plaintiffs who only received dilutable equal protection would wonder why
they did not receive permanent relief.
Once again we see an argument that is not completely rebuttable. It
is difficult to argue that two muddles are better than one. Nevertheless,
the increased muddle may reflect the increased complexity of contem-
porary equal protection concerns. Certainly no bright line between the
"rational purpose" test and the "intermediate scrutiny" text exists after
Cleburne. The Court acknowledged that some regulation of the mentally
retarded is necessary, but that housing bans were "irrational." Although
the result was correct, the unchecked use of the very flexible "rationality"
test could lend to disastrous results. The Court may err in finding a
reasonable belief to be "irrational." For example, what would happen if
the Court concluded that excluding AIDS victims from schools is "irra-
tional" by relying on medical evidence that erroneously demonstrated
that children cannot easily spread the disease, an error caused by a sub-
sequent mutation of the virus (or even by a misinterpretation of existing
data)?
The proposal would eventually generate a crazy-quilt set of results that
do not mesh well with the prevailing judicial themes of consistency, prin-
ciple, and precedent. Over a period of years, Congress would probably
reverse some of Court's decisions, while letting others stand. The pattern
would primarily reflect political motivations, difficult to decipher since
Congress has no obligation to explain itself or to achieve consistency.
Nevertheless, the Court can interpret Congressional action. When the
Court delegated a final decision to Congress under this proposal, it only
delegated the specific issue. Thus, for example, if the Court had held in
a subsequent reconsideration of Kadrmas that states could not charge
school bus fees, yet also held that its decision was reversible under section
five, than Congress could obviously pass a law authorizing the states to
charge such fees. But Congress could not pass a law precluding the Court
from considering any other equal protection issues involving indigency.
Nor should the Court interpret any Congressional reversal so broadly.
The Court must retain the power initially to determine all fourteenth
amendment claims.
Even if the Court is initially rebuffed by Congress on a certain issue,
it could continue to try to protect a given group in other ways. It could
remain committed to the analysis that led it to protect the group, or the
right in the first place. The Court should only defer to Congress on the
specific issue. Perhaps a series of opinions would convince Congress and
the public that the Court was correct to expand equal protection to help
poor children. The process might take years, but it would be worth the
effort. The present doctrine creates the impression that poverty is not a
major constitutional concern, and that the government can, with a few
narrow exceptions, treat poor people as it wishes. In addition, the Court's
existing constitutional treatment of the poor is hardly graced with con-
sistency, much less elegance.
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The doctrine would also create some anomalies. The Court might strike
down a harsh state welfare law, such as Dandridge v. William's cap on
amounts given to family, yet tolerate an equally severe federal food stamp
limitation, such as the denial of food stamps to families who have a worker
on strike in Lyng v. International Union, UAW. In other words, if a state
had limited food supplies to poor families the way Congress did in Lyng,
the Supreme Court might have found such a limitation a section five
violation. Such inconsistency is certainly disconcerting, but it might be
politically healthy. The Court would be performing a prodding role, show-
ing Congress that some of its laws exist under a constitutional cloud. The
Congressional law may be ultimately constitutional, if only because of
the judicial deference given to another co-equal branch over an admittedly
difficult issue, but the law clashes with the underlying aspirations of the
Equal Protection Clause.
At least one more problem remains. Could the Court ever change its
mind, making certain dilutable rights nondilutable or certain nondilut-
able rights dilutable? By this time, the reader will probably not be sur-
prised to learn that the author subscribes to a one-way ratchet theory.
In other words, if a series of section five cases eventually creates a co-
herent doctrine that is implicitly ratified by Congressional inaction over
a long period of time, the Court might make that group of rights non-
dilutable. Equal protection is an evolutionary doctrine. If certain deci-
sions survive the test of time, thereby generating powerful reliance
expectations, they may deserve to become permanent constitutional law.
However, the Court should not dilute rights it has previously found to be
permanent. It made its initial decision on the assumption that the action
was so "unreasonable" that the other branches could never utilize power
in that particular way. When a state or federal action is found to be so
egregious, it should not be constantly re-evaluated. Finally, the Court
should be reluctant to transfer rights between dilution and nondilution
because that process would probably create more confusion than benefits.
The proposed doctrine is already admittedly complex, difficult to admin-
ister and prone to generating inconsistent results. Creating an additional
set of tests to determine when dilutable rights become nondilutable would
make the doctrine even more difficult to manage.
X. CONCLUSION
The dilemma of democracy is not just distrust-distrust of majorities,
minorities, legislatures, executive branches, courts, other individuals,
even oneself. Each of us must also decide when to trust the other, knowing
that at any time some or most of us can turn to good or evil. All of us
are both "the Other" and "Thou." Failure to recognize such ambivalence
leads either to an atomized society which excessively relies upon guns
and/or law for protection or to foolish vulnerability. The debate over the
proper scope of judicial review is one manifestation of this dilemma of
human nature; we do not completely trust either the Supreme Court or
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the elected branches since any organ of government can unfairly harm
us. Yet we need lawmakers, adjudicators and fellow citizens-not just for
protection, but also for community and self-definition.
Reevaluating section five caselaw means reconsidering one's hopes and
fears. The proposal assumes substantial good faith by both the Court and
Congress, an obviously controversial belief at this point in the political
cycle. Thus the idea may be so premature as to be stillborn. Nevertheless,
I think those of us who believe the Court ought to use its powers to help
prevent the polarization of classes and races, as well as to prevent certain
forms of societal cruelty and callousness, have a duty to make specific
proposals to implement that belief without losing sight of democratic
premises. Perhaps our offerings will be too timid or excessively aspira-
tional. But it is part of our fate to offer imperfect solutions to a world
filled with inevitable sorrow.
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